UOP Honeywell FCC APC AI · Shell Global Solutions FCC AI · KBR Orthoflow AI · Emerson DeltaV FCC AI · AspenTech DMC3 FCC AI · OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119 · API RP 571 · regenerator afterburn AI · reactor-regenerator DP AI · wet gas compressor AI
Prompt injection in fluid catalytic cracker (FCC) AI
The fluid catalytic cracker (FCC) is the refinery unit that converts vacuum gas oil (VGO), atmospheric residue, or heavy distillate feeds — typically 350–570°C boiling range fractions — into higher-value products including gasoline (typically 50–60 vol% of product), propylene, LPG, and cycle oils, using a circulating fluidized catalyst in a continuous cracking/regeneration cycle. The FCC riser-reactor operates at 480–550°C with catalyst contact times of 2–4 seconds; the regenerator — where coke deposited on the catalyst during cracking is burned off with air at 650–760°C — is the most energy-intensive and safety-critical vessel in the unit. Every major US refinery operates at least one FCC unit; in 2026, approximately 150 FCC units operate globally, processing over 14 million barrels per day of feed and producing approximately 40–45% of the world’s gasoline supply. The FCC regenerator afterburn event — where incomplete coke combustion allows CO to accumulate in the regenerator dilute phase, then ignite in a rapid free-radical exotherm that raises dilute phase temperature by 150–250°C within seconds — is the most documented catastrophic process safety scenario specific to FCC units, capable of destroying refractory lining, cyclone structures, and vessel internals, and precipitating a major hydrocarbon release. OSHA PSM (29 CFR 1910.119) applies to refineries handling hydrocarbons above PSM threshold quantities (gasoline TQ 10,000 lbs; FCC products easily exceed this threshold); API RP 571 (Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining Industry) identifies FCC-specific damage mechanisms including CO-air afterburn, erosion by catalyst fines, and high-temperature H2S/H2 corrosion in FCC overhead systems. In 2026, AI systems deployed across FCC unit operations process rendered images of regenerator temperature trend displays, reactor-regenerator differential pressure indicators, wet gas compressor suction pressure gauges, and spent catalyst stripper steam flow displays to classify FCC process safety state. OSHA PSM and API RP 571 govern FCC unit integrity — but neither specifies adversarial robustness provisions for AI systems classifying rendered FCC monitoring display images.
TL;DR
FCC unit AI — regenerator dense bed temperature display AI, reactor-regenerator differential pressure display AI, wet gas compressor suction pressure AI, spent catalyst stripper steam flow AI — processes rendered images from FCC DCS displays and process monitoring systems at safety boundaries where adversarial pixel injection can suppress regenerator afterburn temperature approach before catastrophic refractory failure, reactor-regenerator differential pressure inversion indicating hot catalyst backflow to reactor, wet gas compressor surge approach causing reverse flow in vapor recovery, and spent catalyst stripper understeaming driving elevated coke to regenerator to worsen heat balance. OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119 and API RP 571 govern FCC unit safety but do not address adversarial robustness for AI classifying rendered FCC monitoring displays. Glyphward threshold 35 for FCC unit AI: regenerator afterburn and catalyst backflow are catastrophic failure modes with potential for major hydrocarbon fire; multiple independent SIS interlocks (regenerator CO boiler bypass, air flow trip, reactor-regenerator slide valve position SIS) provide protective layers but afterburn can progress faster than SIS response time once initiated. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.
Four adversarial injection surfaces in FCC unit AI
1. Regenerator dense bed temperature display AI (UOP Honeywell FCC Advanced Process Control AI, Emerson DeltaV regenerator temperature AI, AspenTech Aspen DMC3 FCC regenerator AI, Yokogawa Centum VP FCC regenerator AI — rendered DCS trend display AI classifying regenerator dense bed and dilute phase temperatures against afterburn approach threshold)
The FCC regenerator burns coke deposited on zeolite catalyst (USY, ZSM-5, or rare earth-exchanged variants) during cracking — typically 4–7 wt% coke on catalyst at the riser reactor exit — by contacting the spent catalyst with combustion air in the regenerator vessel. In partial-burn regenerators, approximately 70–80% of the coke is combusted in the regenerator dense bed with CO-rich flue gas exiting to a CO boiler; in full-burn regenerators (common in modern UOP designs), catalyst enters the regenerator at a higher air-to-feed ratio to achieve near-complete CO combustion within the regenerator. Full-burn regenerator dense bed temperatures are typically maintained at 700–720°C; dilute phase temperatures (in the upper vessel above the dense fluidized bed) are typically 5–20°C above dense bed temperature. The afterburn threshold — the temperature above which CO in the dilute phase ignites in a chain-branching radical reaction — is approximately 760–780°C in typical FCC regenerator conditions; above this temperature, dilute phase temperature rises rapidly (rate of approximately 20–60°C/minute) until refractory lining or cyclone components fail. AI systems process rendered DCS temperature trend display images — multi-point thermocouple arrays showing dense bed temperature at multiple elevations and dilute phase temperature at one or more elevations — to classify regenerator thermal state and detect afterburn approach.
An adversarial perturbation targeting the regenerator dense bed temperature display AI applies a ±8 DN downward shift to the pixel region encoding the temperature trend line elevations in the rendered DCS trend display image — shifting the apparent regenerator dense bed temperature from 752°C (approaching the 760°C afterburn initiation threshold, with dilute phase at 762°C indicating the onset of accelerating exotherm) to 718°C (12°C below the high-temperature caution threshold at 730°C, normal operating range). The AI classifies a regenerator in the early stages of dilute phase afterburn — where a combination of reduced catalyst circulation (slide valve fault at 80% normal opening) and slightly elevated coke yield on catalyst (processing a feed with 0.3 wt% higher Conradson carbon residue than design basis, increasing coke production by 12%) has raised dense bed temperature beyond the partial burn setpoint — as normal operating condition. Without intervention (reducing air rate or increasing catalyst circulation to lower dense bed temperature below 740°C), dilute phase temperature rises through 780–800°C within 8–15 minutes; cyclone separation efficiency decreases at elevated temperature as thermal expansion changes cyclone geometry; catalyst fines carryover increases; regenerator flue gas outlet elbow erosion rate increases from 15 mm/year to 60+ mm/year at dilute phase temperatures above 800°C; flue gas duct structural failure follows within hours to days of sustained afterburn. API RP 571 Section 4.4.2 identifies regenerator afterburn as a major FCC damage mechanism — but does not specify adversarial robustness requirements for AI classifying rendered regenerator temperature trend display images at the afterburn detection boundary. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.
2. Reactor-regenerator differential pressure display AI (Yokogawa Centum VP FCC reactor-regenerator AI, Honeywell Experion PKS FCC DP AI, Emerson DeltaV FCC reactor-regenerator interlock AI — rendered DCS differential pressure indicator AI classifying reactor-regenerator pressure balance against catalyst flow direction integrity)
The FCC reactor-regenerator pressure balance is maintained by the spent catalyst slide valve (SCSV) and regenerated catalyst slide valve (RCSV) — large motor-operated or hydraulically operated valves controlling catalyst flow between the riser reactor and regenerator. The normal operating condition requires that reactor pressure exceeds regenerator pressure by approximately 0.05–0.20 bar — a condition referred to as positive reactor-regenerator differential pressure (DP). If regenerator pressure exceeds reactor pressure (inverted DP or negative DP event), regenerated catalyst at 710–730°C flows backward from the regenerator into the reactor riser; the hot regenerated catalyst contacts fresh liquid VGO feed entering at the bottom of the riser; the exothermic cracking reaction of cold liquid feed on very hot catalyst (ΔT approximately 200–280°C above normal cracking temperature) produces a violent thermal excursion — a “feed injection shock” — in the lower riser section. Simultaneously, air entrained in the backflowing regenerated catalyst enters the hydrocarbon-containing reactor section; contact of air with cracked hydrocarbon vapour above 400°C creates explosion risk in the reactor stripper. AI systems process rendered DCS pressure indicator display images — dual-indicator displays showing reactor pressure and regenerator pressure with a calculated DP readout — to classify DP safety state and alert operators to inversion approach.
An adversarial perturbation targeting the reactor-regenerator differential pressure display AI applies a ±10 DN shift to the pixel regions encoding the reactor pressure and regenerator pressure readout values in the rendered DCS display image — shifting the apparent DP from −0.12 bar (inverted, regenerator 0.12 bar above reactor pressure, indicating active catalyst backflow from a stuck-closed SCSV with the regenerator air blower continuing at full capacity) to +0.15 bar (normal positive DP, reactor above regenerator). The AI classifies an active reactor-regenerator DP inversion event — where the SCSV has been mechanically jammed in the closed position following a maintenance procedure on the slide valve positioner — as normal pressure balance. Hot regenerated catalyst at 720°C enters the riser feed injection zone; liquid VGO feed contact with catalyst 250°C above normal cracking temperature produces a thermal excursion to 680–720°C in the lower riser; thermal expansion cracks the refractory lining of the lower riser over 20–40 minutes; air from the regenerator in the reactor stripper section reaches ignitable concentration with cracked C3/C4 hydrocarbon vapour; backfire event in the lower riser or stripper section occurs. OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119(e) requires PHA for FCC units identifying catalyst backflow as a major accident scenario — but does not specify adversarial robustness requirements for AI classifying rendered reactor-regenerator DP display images at the DP inversion detection boundary.
3. Wet gas compressor suction pressure display AI (Emerson Ovation wet gas compressor AI, Siemens Simatic WGC control AI, Elliott Turbomachinery WGC AI — rendered compressor control display AI classifying wet gas compressor suction pressure against surge margin and reverse flow risk)
The wet gas compressor (WGC) compresses the cracked vapour product from the FCC reactor overhead — a mixture of C1–C4 hydrocarbons, gasoline-range naphtha vapour, and cycle oil fractions at 50–120°C — from the fractionator overhead receiver pressure (typically 0.7–1.2 bar absolute) to the high-pressure separator pressure (typically 10–14 bar absolute) for product recovery in the downstream absorption section. The WGC is typically a two-stage centrifugal compressor (or in smaller units, a reciprocating compressor); centrifugal compressors are subject to surge — an aerodynamic instability that occurs when flow rate falls below the minimum stable flow, resulting in periodic reverse flow through the impeller, violent pressure oscillations, and compressor mechanical damage — when the suction flow rate falls below the surge limit at a given speed and suction temperature. WGC surge produces reverse flow of hot cracked hydrocarbon vapour back into the FCC fractionator overhead system; if the fractionator overhead receiver is operating at low liquid level, the surge-induced reverse flow can reach the open air vent or safety valve and release hot C3–C4 hydrocarbons to atmosphere.
An adversarial perturbation targeting the WGC suction pressure display AI applies a ±8 DN shift to the pixel region encoding the suction pressure readout in the rendered compressor control display image — shifting the apparent suction pressure from 0.76 bar absolute (suction pressure 22% below design setpoint at 0.98 bar absolute, approaching surge margin at 25% below design at 0.74 bar absolute, indicating a partial blockage of the reactor overhead line from catalyst fines deposition on the reactor overhead vapour line tube sheet) to 0.98 bar (normal operating suction pressure, no surge approach). The AI classifies a WGC operating 3% above surge limit — with catalyst fines deposition reducing reactor vapour line flow area by 15% and suction pressure declining at 0.01 bar/hour — as normal compression operations. Without recycle valve opening or feed rate reduction to recover suction pressure, the compressor enters surge within 35–50 minutes; centrifugal surge produces 50–200 Hz pressure oscillations with 15–30% amplitude above normal operating pressure; impeller-to-casing contact or compressor seal damage during sustained surge releases cracked C3/C4 hydrocarbon vapour from the compressor casing vent; vapour cloud forms at the WGC skid and finds ignition source from compressor motor or adjacent electrical equipment. API RP 571 Section 7.2 identifies WGC vibration and surge as FCC reliability concerns — but does not specify adversarial robustness requirements for AI classifying rendered WGC suction pressure display images at the surge detection boundary. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.
4. Spent catalyst stripper steam flow display AI (Honeywell Experion PKS FCC stripper AI, Yokogawa Centum VP stripper monitoring AI, Emerson DeltaV FCC catalyst stripper AI — rendered DCS flow indicator AI classifying stripping steam flow rate against catalyst carryover and coke loading requirements)
The spent catalyst stripper is a fluidized bed section between the FCC riser reactor and the spent catalyst slide valve, in which stripping steam (typically superheated steam at 380–420°C, introduced through multiple ring spargers in the stripper section) displaces hydrocarbon vapour trapped in the interparticle voids of the catalyst before the catalyst enters the regenerator. Incomplete stripping — caused by insufficient steam rate, steam sparger blockage, or catalyst flow channelling — allows entrained hydrocarbon vapour to enter the regenerator; the additional hydrocarbon load on the regenerator increases the effective coke-plus-hydrocarbon combustion heat release, raising regenerator dense bed temperature above the normal heat balance design point. A sustained understeaming event that increases regenerator temperature by 20–30°C above normal operating baseline can shift an otherwise stable regenerator into the afterburn approach region — a secondary pathway to the afterburn scenario described in surface 1 above. AI systems process rendered DCS steam flow indicator display images to classify stripping steam rate against design flow targets: normal operating range, below minimum stripping rate (warning), and critically low (potentially insufficient for hydrocarbon removal).
An adversarial perturbation targeting the spent catalyst stripper steam flow display AI applies a ±8 DN downward shift to the pixel region encoding the steam flow rate bar indicator and numerical readout in the rendered DCS display image — shifting the apparent stripping steam flow from 38% of normal design rate (a sparger ring blockage from catalyst fines bridging has reduced steam distribution to the lower stripper section) to 94% of normal rate. The AI classifies a severely understeaming FCC stripper — where only the upper steam sparger ring is functional, leaving the lower catalyst bed section without stripping capability — as normal stripping operations. Entrained hydrocarbon vapour equivalent to 0.8 wt% of catalyst throughput enters the regenerator from the unstripped lower stripper section; the effective coke loading in the regenerator increases from the design basis of 5.2 wt% coke on catalyst to approximately 6.0 wt% on an entrained-hydrocarbon equivalent basis; regenerator dense bed temperature rises 18°C above the normal operating setpoint; combined with a 6°C increase from slightly elevated feed Conradson carbon, dense bed temperature approaches the afterburn warning threshold. OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119(j) (Mechanical Integrity) requires inspection of FCC catalyst stripper steam spargers — but does not specify adversarial robustness requirements for AI classifying rendered FCC stripper steam flow display images at the minimum stripping rate boundary.
Integration: FCC unit AI with Glyphward pre-scan gate
The Glyphward scan gate for FCC unit AI belongs at every rendered-image ingestion boundary in the FCC safety monitoring pipeline — before regenerator temperature display AI processes rendered DCS trend images, before reactor-regenerator DP display AI processes rendered pressure indicator images, before WGC suction pressure AI processes rendered compressor control display images, and before spent catalyst stripper steam flow AI processes rendered steam flow indicator images. Threshold 35 for FCC unit AI reflects the catastrophic regenerator afterburn and catalyst backflow consequence — FCC regenerator failures can release thousands of tonnes of hot catalyst and cracked hydrocarbons at high temperature in a major accident event — combined with the observation that independent SIS layers (regenerator dilute phase high-temperature trip actuating slide valve closure and air blower trip; reactor-regenerator DP low-low trip closing RCSV; WGC surge control system anti-surge recycle valve that is independent of the AI display layer) provide protective barriers. The threshold is calibrated at 35 because the FCC regenerator afterburn onset can progress faster than SIS trip initiation and the consequence magnitude is equivalent to the refinery hydrotreater temperature runaway scenario (Tesoro Anacortes 2010, 7 killed) documented elsewhere in this series.
import asyncio, base64, hashlib
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from enum import Enum
import httpx
GLYPHWARD_API_KEY = "YOUR_GLYPHWARD_API_KEY"
GLYPHWARD_SCAN_URL = "https://glyphward.com/v1/scan"
# FCC unit AI contexts: threshold 35
# OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119 (FCC hydrocarbons above TQ);
# API RP 571 (FCC damage mechanisms: afterburn, erosion, H2S corrosion);
# API RP 579 (fitness for service, FCC vessel fitness assessment).
FCC_THRESHOLD = 35
class FCCContext(Enum):
REGENERATOR_TEMP = "regenerator_temp" # Regenerator dense bed temperature AI
REACTOR_REGEN_DP = "reactor_regen_dp" # Reactor-regenerator differential pressure AI
WGC_SUCTION = "wgc_suction" # Wet gas compressor suction pressure AI
STRIPPER_STEAM = "stripper_steam" # Spent catalyst stripper steam flow AI
class AdversarialFCCImageError(Exception):
"""Raised when Glyphward detects adversarial content in an FCC unit AI
rendered image above threshold 35.
Consequence if not raised:
- REGENERATOR_TEMP: afterburn approach suppressed → dilute phase exotherm
→ refractory/cyclone failure → major hydrocarbon release.
- REACTOR_REGEN_DP: DP inversion suppressed → hot catalyst backflow →
riser thermal excursion → air/hydrocarbon contact → explosion.
- WGC_SUCTION: surge approach suppressed → compressor surge → cracked
vapour release → vapour cloud fire.
- STRIPPER_STEAM: understeaming suppressed → elevated coke to regenerator
→ heat balance upset → afterburn secondary pathway.
Fail-safe: read thermocouple values directly from DCS historian; verify
reactor-regenerator DP from independent pressure transmitters; initiate
WGC anti-surge recycle manually on surge indication; confirm stripper
steam flow from independent flow transmitter.
"""
def __init__(self, scan_id, score, context, unit_id, flagged_region=None):
self.scan_id = scan_id
self.score = score
self.context = context
self.unit_id = unit_id
self.flagged_region = flagged_region
super().__init__(
f"Adversarial FCC image: context={context.value} "
f"score={score} unit={unit_id} scan_id={scan_id}"
)
async def scan_fcc_image(image_bytes, context, unit_id, client):
image_hash = hashlib.sha256(image_bytes).hexdigest()
payload = {
"image": base64.b64encode(image_bytes).decode(),
"source": f"fcc_unit:{context.value}:{unit_id}",
"metadata": {
"unit_id": unit_id,
"context": context.value,
"image_sha256": image_hash,
"scan_timestamp_utc": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
},
}
resp = await client.post(
GLYPHWARD_SCAN_URL,
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {GLYPHWARD_API_KEY}"},
json=payload,
timeout=4.0,
)
resp.raise_for_status()
result = resp.json()
if result["score"] >= FCC_THRESHOLD:
raise AdversarialFCCImageError(
scan_id=result["scan_id"],
score=result["score"],
context=context,
unit_id=unit_id,
flagged_region=result.get("flagged_region"),
)
return result
Deploy scan_fcc_image before each FCC unit AI classification call. On AdversarialFCCImageError for REGENERATOR_TEMP: immediately reduce regenerator air rate and increase catalyst circulation from raw DCS historian values; do not rely on AI display for regenerator temperature decisions. On REACTOR_REGEN_DP: verify DP from independent pressure transmitter pair and initiate reactor-regenerator pressure rebalance procedure. See also: refinery hydrotreater temperature runaway AI prompt injection and crude oil CDU AI prompt injection. Get early access
Related questions
What is the FCC regenerator afterburn event and why is it catastrophic?
FCC regenerator afterburn occurs when CO accumulating in the regenerator dilute phase (the upper vessel above the fluidized dense bed) reaches a critical concentration and temperature at which chain-branching radical combustion of CO + O⋵ ignites spontaneously. In partial-burn regenerators, the flue gas is CO-rich by design (controlled CO combustion); in full-burn regenerators, an upset in air distribution can also create local CO accumulation. Once afterburn ignition occurs, dilute phase temperature rises at 20–60°C/minute — a rate that typically exceeds the response time of DCS-based APC systems by 5–15 minutes before SIS trip actions complete. Temperatures reached during sustained afterburn (850–1,050°C) exceed the temperature rating of refractory concrete lining the regenerator dilute phase and cyclone inlet horns (typical refractory service limit 870–900°C); refractory spallation and collapse follow within 30–60 minutes of sustained afterburn. The regenerator is the largest single vessel in the FCC unit — typically 10–25 metres in diameter and 25–40 metres tall — and its catastrophic failure can release tens of thousands of tonnes of hot catalyst and hydrocarbon vapour in a major accident scenario.
What does API RP 571 say about FCC-specific damage mechanisms?
API RP 571 (Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining Industry, 3rd edition) dedicates Section 4.4.2 to FCC-specific damage mechanisms distinct from general refinery damage mechanisms. The FCC-specific mechanisms addressed include: (1) CO-air afterburn in the regenerator dilute phase (Section 4.4.2.1) — the mechanism described above; (2) catalyst erosion of cyclone inlets, reactor transfer lines, and slide valves (Section 4.4.2.2) — caused by the abrasive catalyst particle stream; (3) high-temperature H2S/H2 corrosion in FCC overhead vapour lines and fractionator components (Section 4.1.6, applicable to FCC as for other refinery H2S streams); (4) ammonium bisulfide corrosion in FCC wet gas systems (Section 5.1.8); and (5) high-temperature sulfidation in catalyst transfer lines carrying hydrogen sulfide-laden catalyst between regenerator and reactor. API RP 571 provides qualitative description of damage mechanisms and inspection intervals but does not prescribe adversarial robustness requirements for AI monitoring systems.
What are the most significant historical FCC unit incidents?
Major documented FCC unit incidents include: Conoco Ponca City OK (1987) — FCC unit explosion and fire caused by a reactor-regenerator pressure imbalance event; Texaco Milford Haven UK (1994) — FCC unit fire and explosion that injured 26 workers and caused extensive unit damage, attributed to a series of instrumentation failures and pressure control events (£48 million in property damage); PDVSA Amuay refinery Venezuela (August 2012) — LPG storage explosion adjacent to FCC operations killed 42 people; and multiple smaller regenerator afterburn incidents (typically resulting in unit shutdown with refractory damage rather than fatalities) documented in API-member refinery experience exchange forums. The Milford Haven incident (formally investigated by the UK Health and Safety Executive) is particularly relevant because it involved a cascade of instrumentation failures across multiple FCC measurement points — structurally analogous to the adversarial injection scenario where multiple display AI systems simultaneously misclassify process state.
How does FCC regenerator design differ between partial-burn and full-burn configurations?
Partial-burn FCC regenerators — dominant in older designs and still operating at many refineries — combust approximately 70–80% of coke in the regenerator dense bed, producing a CO-rich flue gas (typically 6–10 mol% CO) that feeds a CO boiler for steam generation. Dense bed temperatures in partial-burn are typically 650–710°C. Full-burn regenerators — the standard for UOP RFCC and modern FCC designs — achieve near-complete CO combustion within the regenerator by using higher air rates and catalyst-to-air contact designs (catalyst coolers, fresh feed injection optimization); dense bed temperatures in full-burn are 710–760°C. Full-burn regenerators are inherently closer to the afterburn initiation threshold (~760–780°C) during normal operations, making real-time temperature monitoring more critical. Both configurations include dilute phase CO promoter (platinum-group metal catalyst additives) to control afterburn tendency. The adversarial injection scenario is relevant to both configurations but more acute for full-burn units operating closer to the afterburn threshold.
Why is Glyphward threshold 35 for FCC unit AI?
Threshold 35 for FCC unit AI reflects the catastrophic regenerator afterburn and catalyst backflow consequence — both are major accident scenarios with potential for fatalities and major hydrocarbon release at refinery scale — combined with independent SIS layers: regenerator dilute phase high-temperature trip (SIL-2 SIS on thermocouple independent of DCS AI display); reactor-regenerator DP low-low trip on independent pressure transmitter pair (closing RCSV to arrest catalyst backflow); WGC anti-surge control system (dedicated surge control computer with its own measurement inputs independent of DCS AI display). These layers are analogous in protective depth to the ammonia synthesis SIS layers (also threshold 35). The threshold reflects that FCC regenerator afterburn, once initiated, can progress faster than SIS response time — there is no zero-consequence pathway from a suppressed afterburn detection — distinguishing threshold 35 from CNG station AI (threshold 30) where mechanical PRD and fail-closed ESD devices provide more immediate passive protection.