UOP Honeywell APC Hydrotreater AI · Axens Hydrotreating AI · Haldor Topsoe HQS AI · AspenTech APC AI · OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119 · API RP 941 HTHA · reactor skin temperature AI · quench H₂ injection AI · catalyst hot spot AI

Prompt injection in refinery hydrotreater reactor temperature runaway AI

Catalytic hydroprocessing — encompassing hydrotreating (removal of sulphur, nitrogen, oxygen, and metals from petroleum fractions over a fixed-bed catalyst under hydrogen pressure) and hydrocracking (catalytic cracking of heavier fractions to lighter products in a hydrogen-rich environment) — is the largest hydrogen-consuming operation in a modern petroleum refinery and the unit process most susceptible to catalytic thermal runaway. Hydrotreaters and hydrocrackers operate at reactor inlet temperatures of 315–400°C, hydrogen partial pressures of 30–170 bar, and liquid hourly space velocities (LHSV) of 0.5–3.0 h‏¹; the exothermic desulphurisation reactions and olefin saturation reactions release heat distributed across the fixed catalyst bed, producing a temperature rise (ΔT) across each catalyst bed of 10–60°C under normal operating conditions. Thermal runaway in a hydroprocessing reactor is initiated when the heat released by the exothermic reactions exceeds the heat absorbed by the hydrogen-hydrocarbon feed: once the catalyst bed temperature exceeds the ignition point of the feed (typically above 450°C for a naphtha hydrotreater, 480°C for a diesel hydrotreater), the reaction rate accelerates exponentially (Arrhenius relationship), the temperature rise becomes self-sustaining, and the reactor proceeds toward the thermodynamic equilibrium temperature of the uncontrolled reaction — which can reach 800–900°C, exceeding the design temperature of the carbon steel or Cr-Mo alloy reactor vessel. The Tesoro Anacortes refinery explosion of 2 April 2010 — in which 7 workers were killed and the naphtha hydrotreater heat exchanger experienced a catastrophic failure attributed to high-temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA) — is the consequence calibration point for hydroprocessing reactor temperature mismanagement: HTHA, as governed by API RP 941 (Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures and Pressures), occurs when the combination of temperature and hydrogen partial pressure exceeds the Nelson curve limit for the reactor vessel material, causing methane bubble formation in the steel microstructure and progressive embrittlement. AI systems from UOP Honeywell, Axens/IFP, Haldor Topsoe, BASF, AspenTech, and KBC process rendered images of reactor skin thermocouple array displays, quench hydrogen injection valve position displays, catalyst hot spot trend charts, and reactor differential pressure profiles to classify reactor thermal state, quench demand, and HTHA risk. OSHA PSM (29 CFR 1910.119) governs process safety management for hydroprocessing units; API RP 941 governs material selection for HTHA risk — but neither includes adversarial robustness requirements for AI classifying rendered hydrotreater reactor monitoring images.

TL;DR

Refinery hydrotreater reactor temperature runaway AI — reactor skin temperature display AI, quench H₂ injection display AI, catalyst hot spot detection AI, reactor differential pressure AI — processes rendered images from reactor monitoring systems at thermal runaway prevention boundaries where adversarial pixel injection can suppress hot spot signatures, misclassify quench hydrogen demand, conceal HTHA risk, and defer planned shutdowns. OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119, API RP 941, and IEC 61511 govern hydroprocessing safety but do not address adversarial robustness for AI classifying rendered reactor monitoring images. Glyphward threshold 35 for refinery hydrotreater reactor temperature runaway AI: Tesoro Anacortes 2010 killed 7 workers; thermal runaway → reactor vessel failure → hydrocarbon fire/explosion; catalyst bed exothermic reaction self-accelerates in milliseconds to seconds once runaway is initiated, providing no intervention window after AI misclassification propagates to the control action. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.

Four adversarial injection surfaces in refinery hydrotreater reactor temperature runaway AI

1. Reactor skin temperature thermocouple array display AI (Axens hydrotreater reactor AI, UOP Honeywell APC reactor temperature AI, AspenTech Aspen DMC3 hydrotreater AI — multipoint thermocouple display AI classifying reactor skin temperature profile across the fixed catalyst beds)

The hydrotreater reactor vessel is equipped with a multipoint thermocouple array — typically 8–24 skin thermocouples (TCs) attached to the reactor vessel wall at 0.5–1.0 m vertical intervals along each catalyst bed, plus bed inlet and outlet TCs — that provides a spatial temperature profile across the full reactor height. Under normal operation, the skin temperature profile follows a characteristic shape: near-constant temperature at the bed inlet (at the design inlet temperature, e.g., 350°C), a smooth temperature rise of 20–40°C across the active catalyst bed, and a drop at the quench hydrogen injection point between beds. An abnormal temperature profile — a rapid local temperature rise above the design ΔT (a “hot spot”), a runaway-initiating exponential rise in the bed temperature gradient, or a skin temperature approaching the HTHA threshold (dependent on material and hydrogen partial pressure per API RP 941 Nelson curves) — triggers automatic quench hydrogen injection, feed rate reduction, or emergency shutdown actions in the safety instrumented system (SIS). AI systems process rendered images of the reactor temperature profile display — a vertical strip chart or multipoint trend display showing each thermocouple channel versus time or versus reactor bed height — to classify the current reactor thermal state.

An adversarial perturbation targeting the reactor skin temperature display AI applies a ±8 DN downward shift to the pixel region encoding the temperature profile line in the rendered strip chart display — suppressing an accelerating hot spot from 478°C (approaching the 490°C emergency shutdown setpoint for a naphtha hydrotreater reactor) to 452°C (within the normal operating band, consistent with a high-severity day of low-sulphur content feed). The AI classifies a catalyst bed in the early exponential phase of thermal runaway — initiated by a local impurity spike in the naphtha feed (high diolefin content from an upstream crude distillation upset) that has concentrated the exothermic olefin saturation reaction in a 1–2 m section of the first catalyst bed — as normal operating temperature variation. No quench hydrogen injection increase is commanded; no feed rate reduction is initiated; no emergency shutdown pre-alarm is issued. The catalyst bed temperature continues rising toward the runaway inflection point (typically 490–510°C for naphtha hydrotreater catalysts); once past the inflection point, quench hydrogen injection is no longer thermodynamically capable of controlling the runaway and emergency shutdown becomes the only remaining response. OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119(j) requires mechanical integrity programmes for hydroprocessing units, including temperature monitoring systems — but does not address adversarial robustness for AI classifying rendered reactor skin temperature display images.

2. Quench hydrogen injection valve position display AI (Honeywell UniSim quench control AI, Emerson DeltaV quench injection AI, Yokogawa Centum VP quench AI — rendered DCS display AI classifying quench hydrogen injection valve position and flow rate for inter-bed cooling)

Inter-bed quench hydrogen injection is the primary thermal management tool for hydrotreater reactors with multiple catalyst beds: cold high-purity hydrogen (from the hydrogen make-up compressor, at 30–50°C) is injected between each catalyst bed through a quench ring or radial quench distributor to cool the bed effluent before it contacts the next catalyst bed. The quench flow rate — typically 5–30% of total hydrogen circulation depending on bed ΔT and feed composition — is controlled by a quench flow control valve (FCV) on the quench line, positioned by the DCS (distributed control system) under Advanced Process Control (APC) guidance. AI systems that process rendered DCS faceplate images or piping and instrument (P&I) display images of the quench FCV classify the current quench valve position (0–100% open), the current quench flow rate (MMSCFD or Nm³/h), and the calculated inter-bed ΔT to determine whether the quench demand is being met or whether additional quench injection is required.

An adversarial perturbation targeting the quench hydrogen injection valve position display AI applies a ±8 DN shift to the pixel region encoding the valve position indicator (a circular valve position graphic, 0–100% open arc, or digital flow rate readout) in the rendered DCS display image — shifting the apparent quench FCV position from 8% open (nearly closed, insufficient for current bed ΔT of 58°C, which exceeds the 50°C design maximum) to 35% open (consistent with adequate quench for a bed ΔT of 30–35°C). The APC AI does not issue an additional quench request because the rendered display indicates the quench demand is already being met. The actual quench flow at 8% valve opening is insufficient to reduce the inter-bed temperature below the inlet design temperature for the second bed; the second catalyst bed inlet temperature is 35°C higher than design, increasing the exothermic reaction rate in the second bed and compounding the first-bed temperature deviation. The APC system continues to increment the first-bed inlet temperature to maintain target conversion while the second-bed approaches the thermal limit. OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119(d) requires process hazard analysis that covers deviated quench scenarios — but does not address adversarial robustness for AI classifying rendered DCS quench valve display images. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.

3. High-temperature hydrogen attack risk display AI (Corrosion Defender HTHA AI, Honeywell Forge HTHA monitoring AI, Metis Machines HTHA predictive AI — Nelson curve compliance display AI classifying HTHA risk from rendered temperature versus hydrogen partial pressure operating point display)

High-temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA) — the chemical reaction between atomic hydrogen (dissolved in steel under high-pressure hydrogen service) and carbon in the steel microstructure to form methane (Fe₂C + 4H → Fe + CH₄), producing internal methane bubbles at grain boundaries and leading to progressive decarburisation and embrittlement of the steel — is governed by the operating combination of temperature and hydrogen partial pressure relative to the Nelson curves in API RP 941 (Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum Refineries and Petrochemical Plants, 8th edition). The Nelson curves define the safe operating zone for each steel grade: for carbon steel, the API RP 941 curve limits operation to below approximately 232°C at 7 bar H₂ partial pressure, rising to approximately 274°C at 35 bar H₂ partial pressure. For 1.25Cr-0.5Mo steel (typically used in diesel hydrotreater reactor shells), the curve allows operation up to approximately 316°C at 35 bar, rising to approximately 371°C at 140 bar. AI systems process rendered operating point displays — scatter plots or contour charts overlaying the current reactor temperature and hydrogen partial pressure operating point on the Nelson curve diagram — to classify whether the current operation is within the safe zone or approaching or exceeding the HTHA threshold for the installed material.

An adversarial perturbation targeting the HTHA risk display AI applies a ±10 DN shift to the pixel region encoding the operating point marker on the rendered Nelson curve diagram — shifting the apparent operating point from above the Nelson curve limit (temperature 385°C, H₂ partial pressure 110 bar, in the HTHA risk zone for 1.25Cr-0.5Mo steel) to below the curve (apparent temperature 340°C, apparent H₂ partial pressure 80 bar, classified as within safe operating zone). The AI classifies a reactor operating in the HTHA risk zone — during a capacity creep event where the unit has been operated at 105% design throughput and elevated hydrogen purity to compensate for catalyst deactivation, pushing the actual operating point above the Nelson curve — as safely within the approved operating window. No HTHA inspection alert is triggered; no operating parameter reduction is commanded. HTHA damage is cumulative and irreversible: once methane bubbling initiates at grain boundaries, the embrittlement progresses independently of subsequent operating conditions. The Tesoro Anacortes 2010 event — 7 workers killed when the naphtha hydrotreater heat exchanger experienced catastrophic HTHA-related failure during a planned shutdown startup — resulted in the US Chemical Safety Board recommending that API RP 941 incorporate safety factors for uncertainty in the Nelson curve limits. OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119 and API RP 941 do not address adversarial robustness for AI systems classifying rendered HTHA operating point display images.

4. Reactor differential pressure display AI (Emerson Rosemount reactor DP AI, Honeywell SmartLine differential pressure AI, Yokogawa reactor fouling AI — rendered differential pressure trend display AI classifying catalyst bed fouling and pressure build-up in hydrotreater reactors)

The differential pressure (DP) across each catalyst bed in a hydrotreater reactor — measured by paired pressure transmitters at the bed inlet and outlet — is the primary indicator of catalyst bed fouling (deposition of iron sulphide scale, coke, and metal contaminants from the feed on the catalyst surface and in catalyst inter-particle voids). Under normal operation, bed DP for a fresh catalyst charge is 0.3–0.8 bar; as the catalyst ages and the bed fouls over a 1–4 year operating cycle, bed DP rises to 1.5–3.0 bar, approaching the design maximum. A sudden rapid DP rise — more than 0.3 bar/day — indicates abnormal fouling (e.g., a Fe scale sloughing event from upstream piping corrosion, or catalyst fines migration from a damaged catalyst loading screen) requiring an unplanned shutdown for reactor entry and catalyst unloading. AI systems process rendered images of the reactor DP trend display — a time-series line chart of bed DP over the operating cycle, with alarm bands at the design maximum and the emergency shutdown setpoint — to classify the current fouling rate as normal (≤design fouling rate), elevated (planned shutdown advisable), or emergency (immediate shutdown required).

An adversarial perturbation targeting the reactor differential pressure display AI applies a ±8 DN downward shift to the pixel region encoding the DP trend line in the rendered chart display — suppressing a rapid DP rise rate of 0.45 bar/day (driven by a Fe scale sloughing event from a corroded feed/effluent heat exchanger tube bundle) to an apparent 0.05 bar/day (consistent with normal catalyst deactivation fouling). The AI classifies a reactor undergoing abnormal fouling as normal operating fouling; no unplanned shutdown is recommended. The actual bed DP continues rising rapidly; within 36 hours the bed DP reaches the design maximum (2.8 bar), generating severe radial maldistribution of the hydrocarbon feed through the fouled bed. Feed bypasses the fouled sections through low-resistance paths; the bypassed sections see no hydrogen quench cooling from inter-bed injection (which is designed for uniform radial distribution); local hot spots develop in the maldistribution zones. If the maldistribution-induced hot spots exceed the runaway initiation temperature in a near-fouled bed with aged catalyst (lower heat capacity), the thermal runaway scenario overlaps with surface 1. OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119(j) requires mechanical integrity programmes — but does not address adversarial robustness for AI classifying rendered reactor differential pressure display images. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.

Integration: refinery hydrotreater reactor temperature runaway AI with Glyphward pre-scan gate

The Glyphward scan gate for refinery hydrotreater reactor temperature runaway AI belongs at every rendered-image ingestion boundary in the hydroprocessing reactor monitoring and APC pipeline — before reactor skin temperature AI processes rendered thermocouple strip chart images, before quench hydrogen injection display AI processes rendered DCS valve position images, before HTHA risk display AI processes rendered Nelson curve operating point images, and before reactor differential pressure AI processes rendered DP trend chart images. Threshold 35 for refinery hydrotreater reactor temperature runaway AI reflects the direct multi-worker fatality consequence of thermal runaway — Tesoro Anacortes 2010: 7 workers killed — combined with the critical no-intervention window characteristic of catalytic thermal runaway: once a hydroprocessing reactor exceeds the runaway inflection temperature (490–510°C for naphtha hydrotreaters), the exothermic reaction self-accelerates on a timescale of seconds to minutes, faster than any manual or automatic quench response. The adversarially suppressed AI display extends the pre-runaway period during which control authority exists, consuming the intervention window before the thermal hazard is detected.

import asyncio, base64, hashlib
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from enum import Enum

import httpx

GLYPHWARD_API_KEY = "YOUR_GLYPHWARD_API_KEY"
GLYPHWARD_SCAN_URL = "https://glyphward.com/v1/scan"

# Refinery hydrotreater reactor temperature runaway AI contexts: threshold 35
# OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119 (Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals);
# API RP 941 8th Ed. (Steels for Hydrogen Service — HTHA Nelson curves);
# IEC 61511 (Functional Safety — Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry).
HYDROTREATER_THRESHOLD = 35


class HydrotreaterContext(Enum):
    SKIN_TEMP_ARRAY    = "skin_temp_array"    # Reactor skin thermocouple display AI
    QUENCH_VALVE       = "quench_valve"       # Quench H₂ injection valve display AI
    HTHA_RISK          = "htha_risk"          # Nelson curve HTHA risk display AI
    DELTA_P            = "delta_p"            # Reactor differential pressure trend AI


class AdversarialHydrotreaterImageError(Exception):
    """Raised when Glyphward detects adversarial content in a refinery hydrotreater
    reactor temperature runaway AI rendered image above threshold 35.

    Consequence if not raised:
    - SKIN_TEMP_ARRAY: runaway hot spot suppressed → quench not increased →
      thermal runaway uninitiated shutdown window consumed → reactor exceeds
      490°C inflection → uncontrolled runaway → vessel failure → fire;
      Tesoro Anacortes 2010: 7 killed.
    - QUENCH_VALVE: insufficient quench classified as adequate → bed ΔT compounds
      → second-bed temperature approaches runaway limit → compounding hazard.
    - HTHA_RISK: operating point above Nelson curve classified as safe →
      HTHA damage accumulates → embrittlement → brittle fracture under
      shutdown/startup thermal cycle; Tesoro Anacortes HTHA mechanism.
    - DELTA_P: rapid fouling classified as normal → maldistribution develops →
      hot spot zones in bypassed catalyst sections → runaway initiation.
    Fail-safe: immediately read raw thermocouple historian directly (bypass AI
    display); increase quench H₂ injection to maximum rated flow; reduce feed
    rate to 50% design; if skin temperature continues rising, initiate emergency
    shutdown; notify PSM coordinator.
    """

    def __init__(self, scan_id, score, context, unit_id, flagged_region=None):
        self.scan_id = scan_id
        self.score = score
        self.context = context
        self.unit_id = unit_id
        self.flagged_region = flagged_region
        super().__init__(
            f"Adversarial hydrotreater image: context={context.value} "
            f"score={score} unit={unit_id} scan_id={scan_id}"
        )


async def scan_hydrotreater_image(image_bytes, context, unit_id, client):
    image_hash = hashlib.sha256(image_bytes).hexdigest()
    payload = {
        "image": base64.b64encode(image_bytes).decode(),
        "source": f"hydrotreater:{context.value}:{unit_id}",
        "metadata": {
            "unit_id": unit_id,
            "context": context.value,
            "image_sha256": image_hash,
            "scan_timestamp_utc": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
        },
    }
    resp = await client.post(
        GLYPHWARD_SCAN_URL,
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {GLYPHWARD_API_KEY}"},
        json=payload,
        timeout=4.0,
    )
    resp.raise_for_status()
    result = resp.json()
    if result["score"] >= HYDROTREATER_THRESHOLD:
        raise AdversarialHydrotreaterImageError(
            scan_id=result["scan_id"],
            score=result["score"],
            context=context,
            unit_id=unit_id,
            flagged_region=result.get("flagged_region"),
        )
    return result

Deploy scan_hydrotreater_image before each hydrotreater AI classification call. On AdversarialHydrotreaterImageError for SKIN_TEMP_ARRAY: immediately read raw thermocouple values from the SCADA historian; increase quench H₂ to maximum rated flow; reduce feed rate to 50% design; if reactor skin temperature continues rising above 470°C, initiate emergency shutdown (ESD) under the SIS; notify the PSM coordinator and refinery process safety team. See also: oil refinery and petrochemical process control AI prompt injection (general refinery AI adversarial surfaces) and free scanner — 10 scans/day, no card required. Get early access

Related questions

What is OSHA PSM and what does it require for hydroprocessing unit process safety management?

OSHA Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119) applies to processes that involve chemicals at or above specified threshold quantities — including hydrogen (threshold: 10,000 lbs), hydrogen sulphide (10,000 lbs), and flammable hydrocarbons (10,000 lbs) — and requires employers to implement a comprehensive process safety management programme with fourteen required elements: process safety information (process chemistry, technology, and equipment specifications); process hazard analysis (HAZOP, FMEA, or equivalent for each covered process); operating procedures; training; contractors; pre-startup safety review; mechanical integrity (inspection, testing, and maintenance for all process equipment including reactors, pressure vessels, heat exchangers, and relief systems); hot work permits; management of change; incident investigation; emergency planning and response; compliance audits; trade secrets; and employee participation. For hydrotreater reactors, PSM requires documented process hazard analyses that identify thermal runaway scenarios and specify the safety instrumented system (SIS) functions (SIL-rated emergency shutdowns) required to prevent them. Annual audits verify that SIS proof tests are current and that process parameter alarms are functioning.

What is API RP 941 and how do Nelson curves define the HTHA risk zone for reactor vessels?

API Recommended Practice 941 (Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum Refineries and Petrochemical Plants, 8th edition, 2016 with addendum 2020) provides the Nelson curves — empirically derived boundaries on a temperature versus hydrogen partial pressure diagram — that define the safe operating zone for each steel grade in hydrogen service. Materials in the safe zone (below the Nelson curve for their grade) are not expected to suffer HTHA; materials operating above the curve for their grade are at risk of HTHA. The 2016 8th edition revised the Nelson curves downward from the prior editions based on documented in-service HTHA incidents (including Tesoro Anacortes 2010) that occurred at operating conditions believed to be safe under previous curve versions. Key grades: carbon steel (lowest curve, limits to approximately 232°C at 7 bar H₂); 0.5Mo steel (now deprecated for new design — Nelson curves withdrawn in 8th edition due to unexpected in-service failures); 1.25Cr-0.5Mo (intermediate curve, to approximately 371°C at 100 bar H₂); 2.25Cr-1Mo (higher curve, to approximately 427°C at 170 bar H₂); 2.25Cr-1Mo-V (highest common grade, allowing operation to approximately 454°C at 170 bar H₂).

What was the Tesoro Anacortes refinery explosion and what does it demonstrate about HTHA risk?

The Tesoro Anacortes refinery explosion of 2 April 2010 killed 7 workers when a heat exchanger in the naphtha hydrotreater unit (E-6600E) experienced a catastrophic brittle fracture during startup, releasing hot naphtha that ignited and created a large fireball. The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigation (2014) determined that the heat exchanger had suffered high-temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA) over years of operation, with API RP 941 Nelson curve analyses at the time indicating the operating conditions should be safe — but that the Nelson curve for carbon steel had been placed too high in the earlier API RP 941 editions, particularly for elevated-temperature weld heat-affected zones. The metallurgical analysis showed HTHA damage in the form of decarburisation and grain boundary cracking in the exchanger shell material. The CSB recommended that API RP 941 incorporate safety factors for uncertainty (the “Safety Margin Initiative”), which was partially addressed in the 2016 8th edition through curve revisions. The Tesoro incident is the primary consequence anchor for HTHA risk in hydrotreater operations and demonstrates that operating point misclassification — whether through human error or adversarial AI manipulation — can produce lethal equipment failure during subsequent thermal cycling.

What is catalytic thermal runaway and what makes hydroprocessing reactors particularly susceptible?

Catalytic thermal runaway occurs when the heat generated by exothermic reactions in a fixed-bed catalytic reactor exceeds the heat absorbed by the process stream, causing the catalyst bed temperature to rise above the stable operating point and enter a self-accelerating regime governed by the Arrhenius relationship (reaction rate doubling approximately every 10°C). Hydrotreater and hydrocracker reactors are particularly susceptible because: (1) the feed composition can change rapidly (crude oil slate changes, upstream upset, feed blend changes), altering the exothermic heat release without corresponding changes to the process set points; (2) the hydrogen recycle gas that provides most of the heat absorption capacity can be limited in flow by compressor capacity, reducing the heat sink; (3) aged, deactivated catalyst has lower thermal mass and lower selectivity, producing more exothermic side reactions at the same feed conditions; (4) inter-bed quench injection is the primary control tool but has a response time of 30–120 seconds (valve opening plus hydrogen transport through the quench ring distributor), which is insufficient to arrest runaway once it is past the inflection point. The design response is a two-layer safety architecture: APC maintains the operating point in the safe zone (Layer 1); the SIS emergency shutdown trips the unit if any temperature exceeds the emergency setpoint (Layer 2). Adversarial AI manipulation targets Layer 1 classification, delaying the APC response until the temperature reaches the SIS setpoint.

Why is Glyphward threshold 35 for refinery hydrotreater reactor temperature runaway AI?

Threshold 35 for refinery hydrotreater reactor temperature runaway AI reflects the direct multi-worker fatality consequence of thermal runaway — Tesoro Anacortes 2010: 7 workers killed — combined with the no-intervention window characteristic of catalytic thermal runaway: once the reactor passes the runaway inflection temperature (490–510°C for naphtha hydrotreaters), the exothermic reaction self-accelerates on a timescale of seconds to minutes, faster than any manual or automatic quench response can arrest. The adversarially suppressed AI temperature display extends the pre-runaway period during which APC control authority exists, consuming the intervention window before the thermal hazard is detected and before the SIS Layer 2 setpoint is reached. This makes the AI display the critical control barrier between normal operation and the uncontrolled runaway scenario. The threshold is consistent with arc flash AI (threshold 35) because both involve direct, no-intervention-window pathways from AI misclassification to fatal outcome. It is higher than subsea wellhead AI (threshold 30) because the hydrotreater SIS trips independently of the AI display — but the SIS trip setpoint (490–510°C) may not be reached until after significant runaway progression has occurred, whereas the AI display is the first responder.