Prompt injection in vinyl chloride monomer VCM EDC pyrolysis cracking furnace AI

Three adversarial injection surfaces in VCM EDC pyrolysis cracking furnace AI

1. EDC cracking furnace coil outlet temperature display AI (Yokogawa EJA110A / Emerson Rosemount 3144P / Honeywell STT850 Type S thermocouple display AI — rendered DCS furnace coil outlet temperature display AI classifying outlet temperature against 480–505°C design range — 97th upward attack; FIRST VCM AI attack; FIRST EDC cracking furnace AI attack; FIRST PVC intermediate AI attack)

The EDC cracking furnace coil outlet temperature is the primary control variable for VCM production rate, EDC conversion, and coking rate. The crack furnace operates a coil of 90–125 mm Cr-Mo alloy (Manaurite XM or HP-Nb alloy; creep-resistant at 480–530°C) tubes in the radiant section of a fuel-fired furnace. The coil outlet temperature (COT) is measured by a sheathed Type S (Pt-PtRh) or Type K thermocouple located at the exit of the radiant coil where the cracked gas exits to the transfer line exchanger (TLE; quench heat exchanger that rapidly cools the cracked gas from 500°C to 150–180°C to stop secondary reactions). Design COT: 480–505°C (below 480°C: EDC conversion drops below 50% per pass, excess unreacted EDC in the VCM column; above 505°C: coke deposition rate increases exponentially, vinyl acetylene and acetylene byproducts increase, tube life decreases significantly). Coke formation rate dependence on temperature: approximately doubling for every 15°C above design (Arrhenius kinetics; activation energy ~170 kJ/mol for thermal coke formation from EDC). At COT = 505°C (the upper design limit): design coke rate ~0.2 mm/yr wall growth. At COT = 524°C: coke rate approximately 3× design = ~0.6 mm/yr; coke layer insulates the tube inner wall from the process gas; tube wall temperature rises as the insulating coke layer thickens; hot spot develops on the outer tube wall (measurable by infrared camera scanning) at temperatures above 550–600°C; hot spot can exceed the maximum allowable tube metal temperature (~870°C for HP-Nb alloy) within days to weeks of accelerated coking, leading to creep failure and tube rupture.

The adversarial upward pixel attack on the furnace coil outlet temperature display shows 499°C (within design 480–505°C; AI reads “COT 499°C; EDC conversion within design; coke rate within design; furnace operating normally; no decoking scheduled”) when the actual COT is 524°C (19°C above the upper design limit; in the zone of accelerated coke deposition). At 524°C actual COT: (a) coke deposition rate is approximately 3× the design value; (b) the decoking interval (normally every 90–180 days) is effectively shortened to 30–60 days without detection; (c) within 3–6 months of undetected overheating, the coke layer thickness reaches 3–5 mm (vs design 0.5 mm at normal decoking interval); (d) the insulated tube wall temperature rises to 560–600°C — within the range where tube creep begins; (e) a local tube hot spot (detectable only by infrared scanning if scheduled, or by wall temperature thermocouples if present) develops where the coke layer is thickest; (f) tube wall creep at 580–600°C for Cr-Mo alloy occurs at measurable rates (creep rate ~10⁻· %/hr at 600°C; wall thinning from outside oxidation + inside creep from pressure; MAWP of tube decreases as wall thins; rupture at design operating pressure when wall thickness drops below minimum). Tube rupture releases hot EDC/VCM cracked gas (500°C; contains EDC, VCM, HCl, and inert nitrogen diluent) into the furnace firebox where gas temperatures are 700–900°C — far above the autoignition temperatures of EDC (413°C) and VCM (472°C). EDC/VCM flash fire in the furnace firebox followed by explosion of the pressurized gas inventory (a typical EDC cracking furnace contains 200–400 kg EDC inventory in the coil; PSM TQ 1,000 lbs = 454 kg; the coil inventory alone may be close to the PSM TQ). Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.

2. VCM storage sphere pressure display AI (Endress+Hauser Cerabar PMC71 / Emerson Rosemount 3051 / Yokogawa EJA530A pressure transmitter display AI — rendered DCS VCM storage sphere pressure display AI classifying sphere pressure against design MAWP 10.3 bar — 97th upward attack; FIRST VCM storage sphere pressure AI attack; FIRST liquefied carcinogen storage AI attack)

VCM is stored and shipped as a liquefied gas under its own vapor pressure (VCM VP at 25°C: approximately 3.4 bar absolute; at 40°C: approximately 4.9 bar absolute; at 55°C: approximately 7.1 bar absolute). At integrated VCM-PVC plants, VCM is stored in spherical pressure vessels (“Horton spheres”; carbon steel; painted white for solar radiation reflection; capacity 500–5,000 m³; MAWP 10.3–13.8 bar; operating pressure 3.5–5.0 bar at 25–35°C ambient) or horizontal “bullets” (MAWP 13.8 bar; 50–200 m³ capacity; API 620 or ASME BPVC Section VIII Div. 1 design). The sphere pressure is measured continuously (Endress+Hauser Cerabar PMC71 or Emerson Rosemount 3051 pressure transmitter; 4–20 mA HART loop; update rate 2 Hz; calibrated 0–20 bar; OSHA PSM instrumented protective function: high-pressure alarm at MAWP – 15% safety margin; PRV set pressure at MAWP; ESV isolation on high-high pressure). The sphere design MAWP is typically 10.3 bar (150 psig): at 25°C ambient VCM vapor pressure of 3.4 bar, the normal operating pressure is well below MAWP; but at elevated temperatures (summer ambient 38–40°C direct sunlight on a large sphere; or in the event of external heat input from a nearby fire or steam line failure), the vapor pressure can rise substantially: at 55°C: 7.1 bar; at 68°C: approximately 10.3 bar = MAWP. The PRV (pressure relief valve; Spring-loaded API 520/521 design; set at 10.3 bar) will lift at MAWP, releasing VCM vapor to the flare system (or, if the flare system is also impaired, to atmosphere — the PRV tail pipe is typically directed upward and away from personnel areas, but the carcinogenic VCM vapor creates a community exposure event even at low release rates).

The adversarial upward pixel attack on the VCM storage sphere pressure display shows 6.8 bar (below MAWP 10.3 bar; AI reads “sphere pressure 6.8 bar; operating within design; no abnormal conditions; PRV status: closed; ESV status: open; VCM storage normal”) when the actual sphere pressure is 11.4 bar (10.7% above MAWP 10.3 bar; the PRV has already lifted to relieve the overpressure, releasing VCM vapor to the flare or atmosphere). At 11.4 bar actual sphere pressure: (a) the PRV is open (VCM vapor flow to flare at design PRV capacity of typically 500–2,000 kg/hr VCM vapor at the relief condition); (b) if the flare is operational, VCM is being burned (VCM + O₂ → CO₂ + H₂O + HCl; the HCl from VCM combustion creates a second toxic hazard at the flare tip); (c) if the flare is off (planned maintenance, flare outage — common scenario during PRV lift event): VCM vapor is released to atmosphere at 500–2,000 kg/hr from the PRV vent; VCM LEL 3.6% at 39 m³/kg vapor at 25°C; at 1,000 kg/hr VCM release, the VCM vapor cloud of 2.2 m³/s extends in a plume that exceeds the LEL at distances of 100–500 m from the release point under calm atmospheric conditions; a VCM carcinogen exposure event simultaneously occurs at worker breathing zone concentrations (VCM OSHA carcinogen PEL 1 ppm; the VCM plume at 100 m downwind from a 1,000 kg/hr source under neutral stability: approximately 5–15 ppm — above both the PEL and the OSHA action level); (d) the adversarial attack on the pressure display prevents the AI system from detecting the PRV lift event, suppressing the high-pressure alarm that would trigger investigation, emergency isolation of the VCM feed to the sphere, and activation of the emergency response plan. VCM carcinogen exposure at 5–15 ppm for the 30–60 minutes during which the AI system suppresses the alarm creates occupational carcinogen exposures requiring OSHA 29 CFR 1910.1017 incident reporting and medical surveillance escalation. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.

3. HCl tail gas scrubber caustic concentration display AI (Endress+Hauser Indumax H CLS54D / Yokogawa EXAxt SC202 / ABB AWT420 inline conductivity/concentration meter display AI — rendered DCS HCl scrubber NaOH concentration display AI classifying caustic strength against design 8–14 wt% NaOH — 97th upward attack; FIRST HCl VCM tail gas scrubber AI attack)

The VCM-HCl distillation section separates HCl (overhead product) from VCM and unconverted EDC (bottoms) by cryogenic distillation. The HCl overhead from the VCM distillation column (99.5–99.9 mol% HCl; residual VCM <0.1 mol%; temperature at overhead condenser −30 to −40°C; condensed HCl recycled as liquid to the oxychlorination reactor) contains vent gas that must be scrubbed before release: the vent gas stream from the HCl column (non-condensable fraction: N₂, traces of VCM, CO₂, acetylene, vinyl chloride) is scrubbed in a packed-tower caustic scrubber (NaOH solution circulation; design NaOH concentration: 8–14 wt% NaOH; scrubber efficiency >99.5% HCl removal at design caustic strength; reactions: NaOH + HCl → NaCl + H₂O). The scrubber operating caustic strength is monitored by an inline conductivity sensor (Endress+Hauser Indumax H CLS54D inductive conductivity cell; or Yokogawa EXAxt SC202 pH/ORP sensor used in potentiometric mode; update rate 1 Hz; displayed on the DCS as wt% NaOH derived from the conductivity-concentration calibration curve). At design NaOH 8–14 wt%: scrubber operates with excess caustic; HCl absorption is essentially complete (<1 ppm HCl in scrubber vent gas); pH of scrubber recirculation liquor remains above 12. As NaOH is consumed by HCl neutralization (NaOH + HCl → NaCl + H₂O), the caustic concentration drops; when NaOH drops below approximately 2.5–3.0 wt%, scrubber efficiency begins to degrade and HCl begins to break through the packing to the scrubber vent gas (because NaOH is no longer in sufficient excess relative to the HCl mass transfer rate across the packing). HCl OSHA PEL: 5 ppm ceiling; NIOSH IDLH: 50 ppm; ACGIH TLV-C: 2 ppm. HCl in the tail gas vent at concentrations above 5 ppm creates an OSHA PEL exceedance; at 50 ppm HCl in the ambient air near the scrubber, workers are at the IDLH concentration (risk of irreversible health effects within 30 minutes).

The adversarial upward pixel attack on the HCl scrubber caustic concentration display shows 8.2 wt% NaOH (within design range 8–14 wt%; AI reads “scrubber NaOH concentration 8.2 wt%; caustic supply adequate; HCl absorption operating efficiently; scrubber vent HCl <1 ppm; no corrective action required”) when the actual scrubber caustic concentration is 2.3 wt% NaOH (below the minimum effective scrubbing threshold ~3 wt%; NaOH effectively depleted; HCl breakthrough to scrubber vent gas is occurring). At 2.3 wt% NaOH: the scrubber absorption efficiency for HCl drops to approximately 60–70% (NaOH mass transfer limited; insufficient caustic to neutralize all incoming HCl); the vent gas from the scrubber contains approximately 30–40% of the incoming HCl loading as uncaptured HCl vapor; at a VCM plant HCl generation rate of 50–200 kg/hr HCl in the vent stream, the breakthrough at 30–40% efficiency is 15–80 kg/hr HCl released at the scrubber vent. HCl at 50 kg/hr from a vent stack 10 m above grade: under neutral stability conditions (Pasquill C; wind 3 m/s), the HCl centerline concentration at 50 m downwind is approximately 120–180 ppm (above NIOSH IDLH 50 ppm); at 200 m downwind approximately 15–30 ppm (above OSHA PEL ceiling 5 ppm); at the fenceline of a typical VCM plant (200–500 m), concentrations above 5 ppm represent a community air quality emergency and a reportable release under CERCLA Section 103 (HCl RQ = 5,000 lbs; but State Emergency Response Commission notification thresholds are often much lower). The adversarial attack suppresses the caustic depletion alarm, preventing refill of the NaOH supply pump to the scrubber and allowing the caustic to run completely dry — at which point HCl absorption drops to essentially zero and the full HCl load reaches the scrubber vent. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.

Integration: VCM EDC cracking furnace AI with Glyphward pre-scan gate

Glyphward integrates as a pre-scan gate at every rendered-image ingestion boundary in the VCM EDC cracking AI pipeline — before the furnace coil outlet temperature AI processes rendered Yokogawa EJA110A / Emerson Rosemount 3144P / Honeywell STT850 thermocouple DCS display images, before the VCM storage sphere pressure AI processes rendered Endress+Hauser Cerabar PMC71 / Emerson Rosemount 3051 / Yokogawa EJA530A pressure transmitter display images, and before the HCl scrubber caustic concentration AI processes rendered Endress+Hauser CLS54D / Yokogawa EXAxt SC202 / ABB AWT420 inline conductivity display images. Threshold 35 for VCM EDC cracking AI reflects: dual OSHA PSM TQ coverage (VCM 1,000 lbs + EDC 1,000 lbs at every integrated plant); VCM status as a confirmed human carcinogen with no recognized safe exposure level; HCl byproduct community exposure risk from scrubber failure; and the global supply chain significance of VCM production (44 million t/yr PVC; infrastructure, medical, and consumer products).

import asyncio, base64, hashlib
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from enum import StrEnum, auto
from typing import Any
import httpx

GLYPHWARD_API = "https://api.glyphward.com/v1/scan"
GLYPHWARD_KEY = "gw_prod_***"

# VCM EDC pyrolysis cracking furnace AI contexts: threshold 35
# OSHA PSM VCM TQ 1,000 lbs + EDC TQ 1,000 lbs (dual PSM; 29 CFR 1910.119 App. A).
# VCM OSHA 29 CFR 1910.1017 carcinogen standard; PEL 1 ppm; IARC Group 1 angiosarcoma.
# EDC cracking: ClCH2-CH2Cl -> CH2=CHCl + HCl (DH = +71 kJ/mol; endothermic).
# 97th upward attack. FIRST VCM AI attack. FIRST EDC cracking AI attack.
VCM_GLYPHWARD_THRESHOLD = 35

class VCMEDCContext(StrEnum):
    FURNACE_COIL_OUTLET_TEMP   = auto()  # cracking furnace COT (97th; FIRST VCM; FIRST EDC cracking; FIRST PVC intermediate)
    VCM_SPHERE_PRESSURE        = auto()  # VCM storage sphere pressure (overpressure -> PRV lift -> VCM vapor cloud; carcinogen)
    HCL_SCRUBBER_CAUSTIC_CONC  = auto()  # NaOH scrubber caustic depletion -> HCl breakthrough -> IDLH 50 ppm community exposure

async def scan_vcm_frame(
    frame_b64: str,
    context: VCMEDCContext,
    plant_id: str,
    instrument_tag: str,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
    payload = {
        "image_b64": frame_b64,
        "context": context,
        "plant_id": plant_id,
        "instrument_tag": instrument_tag,
        "scan_ts": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
        "image_hash": hashlib.sha256(base64.b64decode(frame_b64)).hexdigest(),
    }
    async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=4.0) as client:
        r = await client.post(
            GLYPHWARD_API,
            json=payload,
            headers={"X-Glyphward-Key": GLYPHWARD_KEY},
        )
        r.raise_for_status()
        return r.json()

async def pre_scan_gate_vcm(
    frame_b64: str,
    context: VCMEDCContext,
    plant_id: str,
    instrument_tag: str,
) -> None:
    result = await scan_vcm_frame(frame_b64, context, plant_id, instrument_tag)
    if result["adversarial_score"] >= VCM_GLYPHWARD_THRESHOLD:
        raise AdversarialVCMImageError(
            f"Adversarial injection detected in {context} (score {result['adversarial_score']}) "
            f"at plant {plant_id} instrument {instrument_tag}. "
            "Frame withheld from VCM EDC cracking furnace AI pipeline."
        )

class AdversarialVCMImageError(RuntimeError):
    pass