Prompt injection in epichlorohydrin ECH allyl chloride chlorohydrination epoxy resin AI

Three adversarial injection surfaces in epichlorohydrin ECH allyl chloride chlorohydrination AI

1. Cl₂ absorber column back-pressure display AI (Endress+Hauser Cerabar PMC51 differential pressure transmitter Cl₂ absorber display AI / Yokogawa EJA430A pressure transmitter Cl₂ absorber back-pressure SCADA display AI / Rosemount 3051 pressure transmitter Cl₂ dissolving absorber column pressure display AI / Honeywell STD800 smart transmitter Cl₂ absorber column back-pressure display AI / Emerson Fisher 3051C absolute pressure transmitter Cl₂ absorber display AI — rendered SCADA Cl₂ absorber column back-pressure display AI classifying the operating pressure at the Cl₂ gas dissolving absorber column against the design operating range of 0.3–0.7 bar gauge, above which Cl₂ dissolution efficiency is assumed adequate and below which potential gas bypass is suspected; 70th upward-direction attack — FIRST epichlorohydrin production attack; FIRST allyl chloride chlorohydrination attack; FIRST epoxy resin precursor plant attack)

In the allyl chloride chlorohydrination process, Cl₂ gas is fed to a packed absorber column (glass-filled or PVDF packing; wetted by circulating dilute brine/chlorohydrin solution) where it dissolves to form HOCl: Cl₂ + H₂O → HOCl + HCl (K_eq = 4.2 × 10−⁴ mol²/L² at 25°C; dissolution is rapid and essentially quantitative in the column at the design contact time). The absorber operating pressure (0.3–0.7 bar gauge above atmospheric) is maintained by the Cl₂ supply pressure minus the column hydraulic resistance; normal operation shows a stable pressure of 0.40–0.60 bar gauge. AI systems at ECH plants (Dow Freeport TX; Spolchemie Ústí nad Labem Czech Republic; Aditya Birla Chemicals Mapa Thailand) monitor rendered SCADA images of the absorber pressure display to classify: 0.3–0.7 bar (normal; Cl₂ dissolving at design rate; HOCl generation adequate); above 0.7 bar (elevated; potential packing fouling or downstream restriction; reduce Cl₂ feed or investigate); below 0.3 bar (low; possible Cl₂ supply interruption; check Cl₂ header pressure). An adversarial upward pixel shift applies a ±8 DN manipulation to the rendered absorber back-pressure SCADA display — shifting the apparent pressure from 0.45 bar (actual; normal; Cl₂ dissolving properly) to 1.2 bar (displayed; above the 0.7 bar upper alert threshold; AI classification “absorber back-pressure elevated; reduce Cl₂ feed to prevent overpressure”). The AI corrective action: reduce Cl₂ mass flow from design 350 kg/hr to 200 kg/hr (a 43% reduction) to “relieve the apparent absorber pressure.”

At 200 kg/hr Cl₂ feed vs the stoichiometric requirement of 350 kg/hr (for an allyl chloride feed of 310 kg/hr; Cl₂/AC molar ratio drops from 1.02 to 0.59 mol/mol), HOCl generation is insufficient for complete AC conversion. The unreacted allyl chloride fraction: at Cl₂/AC = 0.59, HOCl ≈ Cl₂ fed × conversion factor 0.95 = 0.56 mol/mol equivalent; AC conversion ≈ 56%; AC slip = 44% of feed = 136 kg/hr unreacted AC. AC in the chlorohydrin product stream (mixed with water, HCl, and chlorohydrin products) is carried forward to the saponification reactor and subsequently to the ECH distillation column. In the ECH distillation column overhead (bp ECH 116.5°C; bp AC 45.1°C — AC is lighter and concentrates in the overhead), AC vapour at 136 kg/hr throughput concentrates in the overhead reflux drum to 8,000–14,000 ppm AC in the overhead vapour-liquid equilibrium. At the reflux drum temperature of 45°C (slightly above AC bp), the vapour space AC concentration approaches the LEL of 2.9 vol% (29,000 ppm) in the reflux drum and column overhead system. The ECH distillation column overhead infrastructure (including reflux pumps, overhead condenser, and reflux drum) is carbon steel at 45–80°C — any ignition source (pump mechanical seal, static discharge, or electrical equipment spark) in the presence of 8,000–14,000 ppm AC vapour creates a fire and explosion risk. Concurrently, OSHA PSM TQ for allyl chloride (1,000 lbs = 454 kg): at 136 kg/hr AC in the distillation section, the column hold-up time for AC before product draw-off (typically 3–4 hours in the ECH distillation train) accumulates 408–544 kg AC — approaching and exceeding the OSHA PSM TQ — creating an unacknowledged PSM-regulated inventory of AC in a vessel not designed or HAZOP-reviewed for AC service above TQ. This is the 70th upward attack — FIRST epichlorohydrin production attack; FIRST allyl chloride chlorohydrination attack; FIRST epoxy resin precursor plant attack. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.

2. Saponification reactor pH display AI (Mettler-Toledo InPro 4260i pH electrode saponification reactor display AI / Yokogawa FU20 pH transmitter NaOH saponification display AI / Endress+Hauser Memosens CPF81 pH sensor chlorohydrin saponification display AI / Hach Lange sc100 pH controller saponification SCADA display AI / Hamilton Visiferm DO Arc pH sensor saponification reactor display AI — rendered SCADA saponification reactor pH display AI classifying the actual pH of the glycerol chlorohydrin saponification reactor against the design operating range of pH 11.5–13.0 required for rapid and complete NaOH-driven ring closure to ECH: ClCH₂CHOHCH₂Cl + NaOH → ECH + NaCl + H₂O)

In the NaOH saponification step, the mixed glycerol chlorohydrins (primarily 1,3-dichloro-2-propanol and 2,3-dichloro-1-propanol) are reacted with sodium hydroxide solution at pH 11.5–13.0 and 50–70°C to form ECH by dehydrochlorination (ring closure): the reaction rate is strongly pH-dependent — at pH 11.5, ring closure rate constant k ≈ 0.4 min−¹ (half-life ~1.7 min); at pH 13.0, k ≈ 8 min−¹ (half-life ~0.09 min); at pH 10.0 (below design), k ≈ 0.04 min−¹ (half-life ~17 min) and ECH ring-opening hydrolysis (ECH + H₂O → glycerol — the reverse of the desired product) becomes competitive. The critical danger at pH below 10: (a) ECH yield loss from ring-opening hydrolysis (ECH → glycerol reduces ECH output and creates aqueous effluent contaminated with glycerol and chlorohydrins); (b) more dangerously, residual allyl chloride (from incomplete chlorohydrination, Surface 1) reacts with NaOH only slowly at pH <10 to form glycidol (allyl alcohol oxide) rather than being saponified cleanly — AC builds up in the saponification reactor liquid phase at concentrations approaching OSHA PSM TQ. An adversarial upward pixel shift of the saponification reactor pH display (shown pH 12.6 when actual pH 9.8) masks a NaOH feed pump failure that has caused NaOH starvation in the saponification reactor over the preceding 4 hours.

At actual pH 9.8 (NaOH pump P-412 bearing failed; NaOH feed flow = 0 kg/hr vs design 180 kg/hr), the saponification reactor depletion of NaOH from the initial charge (50% NaOH in 12,000 L reactor volume — initial charge 600 kg NaOH) proceeds as the chlorohydrin feed continues at design rate (450 kg/hr chlorohydrin) consuming NaOH at 1.5 mol NaOH/mol chlorohydrin. NaOH consumption rate: 450 kg/hr chlorohydrin / 111 g/mol (dichloropropanol MW) × 2 mol NaOH × 40 g/mol = 324 kg/hr NaOH; initial charge 600 kg depletes in 1.85 hours with no makeup. After 2 hours of NaOH starvation, the reactor pH falls through 10.5 (ECH ring-opening initiation) to 9.8 (actual). ECH yield drops from 97% to 68% (29% yield loss). The 29% ECH yield loss manifests as: (a) chlorohydrin and glycerol contamination of the product stream; (b) AC accumulation (from Surface 1 deficit) no longer saponified by NaOH — up to 450 kg of AC total inventory in the saponification reactor, distillation section, and piping system — 450 kg × 2.20 lb/kg = 990 lbs, approaching the OSHA PSM TQ of 1,000 lbs. The combined Surface 1 + Surface 2 attack (Cl₂ deficit + NaOH starvation) simultaneously reduces ECH yield to 68% and accumulates 990 lbs of OSHA PSM-listed allyl chloride in the plant — a double jeopardy scenario that neither attack alone would produce. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.

3. ECH distillation column overhead temperature display AI (Yokogawa EJA110A differential pressure transmitter ECH column overhead temperature display AI / Emerson Rosemount 644 temperature transmitter ECH overhead condenser display AI / Endress+Hauser iTEMP TMT72 overhead temperature display AI / ABB TSP341-TW temperature transmitter ECH distillation column overhead display AI / Honeywell temperature transmitter ECH fractionator overhead display AI — rendered SCADA ECH distillation column overhead temperature display AI classifying the vapour temperature at the ECH fractionator column overhead against the design operating range of 110–118°C (pure ECH bp 116.5°C at 1 atm; overhead temperature within this range confirms on-spec ECH product; elevated overhead temperature indicates heavy-component carryover; depressed overhead temperature indicates light-component (AC) accumulation in the overhead)

The ECH product distillation column (atmospheric operation; ECH bp 116.5°C; allyl chloride bp 45.1°C; dichloropropanol bp 174–182°C) relies on overhead temperature as the primary indicator of product separation quality. In the design-case overhead temperature of 110–118°C indicates pure ECH (small amount of reflux maintains column-top temperature within 6°C of ECH bp). An adversarial upward pixel shift of the overhead temperature display (shown 115°C when actual 62°C) masks the presence of a large allyl chloride fraction in the overhead vapour — AC bp 45.1°C indicates the column overhead is dominated by AC vapour rather than ECH vapour. At 62°C actual overhead temperature (vs 115°C displayed), the column overhead composition is predominantly AC + water azeotrope (AC forms a low-boiling azeotrope with water at 44.5°C/77.4 mol% AC), with ECH present at only 20–30 mol% in the overhead draw. The overhead reflux drum at 62°C actual temperature contains a two-phase (organic AC-rich layer + aqueous chlorohydrin-rich layer) mixture with a vapour space at approximately 55–70°C, well within the flammable range of the AC/air mixture (AC flash point −29°C; ignition possible at any temperature above −29°C in air).

The ±8 DN upward manipulation of the rendered overhead temperature SCADA display (115°C displayed vs 62°C actual) causes the AI classification “ECH column overhead temperature within specification; product draw is on-specification ECH; no action required on reflux rate or feed rate.” The control system continues to draw ECH overhead product at design rate — however, this product is not ECH (it is predominantly AC/water azeotrope). The “ECH product” being drawn off and sent to the ECH product storage tank is approximately 70 mol% allyl chloride — a highly flammable (flash point −29°C) and carcinogenic material (IARC 2A) contaminating the ECH product tank. The ECH product tank (atmospheric, carbon steel, typically outdoor storage at ambient temperature 20–35°C) now receives 70 mol% AC — flash point −29°C far below ambient — creating a flammable liquid inventory in a vessel not classified for, or equipped to handle, Class IB flammable liquid (AC) under NFPA 30. The compound three-surface attack (Cl₂ deficit + NaOH starvation + overhead temperature falsification) routes flammable, carcinogenic AC into the ECH product tank, accumulates OSHA PSM-TQ quantities of AC across the distillation train, and sends off-specification product to customers — simultaneously creating fire risk, PSM compliance failure, and a product quality/recall event. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.

Integration: epichlorohydrin ECH allyl chloride chlorohydrination AI with Glyphward pre-scan gate

Glyphward integrates as a pre-scan gate at every rendered-image ingestion boundary in the ECH allyl chloride chlorohydrination AI pipeline — before the Cl₂ absorber back-pressure AI processes rendered SCADA pressure display images, before the saponification reactor pH AI processes rendered SCADA pH controller display images, and before the ECH distillation column overhead temperature AI processes rendered SCADA temperature display images. Threshold 32 for ECH allyl chloride chlorohydrination AI reflects: OSHA PSM TQ 1,000 lbs allyl chloride (NFPA 3-0-2 flammability; flash point −29°C; LEL 2.9%); IARC Group 2A probable carcinogen (ECH and allyl chloride; confirmed DNA glycidyl adduct formation in occupationally exposed workers); NIOSH IDLH 5 ppm ECH (skin absorption confirmed); distillation column overhead AC accumulation creates fire risk in hot column infrastructure; AC/ECH co-presence in product storage creates off-specification product with flammability and carcinogenicity implications for downstream epoxy resin manufacturers; Dow Freeport TX Solvay Tavaux Spolchemie Ústí nad Labem Aditya Birla Mapa Thailand.

import asyncio, base64, hashlib
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from enum import StrEnum, auto
from typing import Any
import httpx

GLYPHWARD_API = "https://api.glyphward.com/v1/scan"
GLYPHWARD_KEY = "gw_prod_***"

# ECH allyl chloride chlorohydrination AI contexts: threshold 32
# OSHA PSM allyl chloride TQ 1,000 lbs; IARC Group 2A ECH+AC; IDLH 5 ppm ECH.
# 70th upward attack: Cl2 absorber back-pressure 1.2 bar shown when 0.45 bar actual.
ECH_THRESHOLD = 32

class ECHContext(StrEnum):
    CL2_ABSORBER_PRESSURE    = auto()  # Cl2 absorber column back-pressure (70th upward attack)
    SAPONIFICATION_PH        = auto()  # NaOH saponification reactor pH
    OVERHEAD_TEMPERATURE     = auto()  # ECH distillation column overhead temperature

async def scan_ech_frame(
    frame_b64: str,
    context: ECHContext,
    plant_id: str,
    instrument_tag: str,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
    payload = {
        "image_b64": frame_b64,
        "context": context,
        "plant_id": plant_id,
        "instrument_tag": instrument_tag,
        "scan_ts": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
        "image_hash": hashlib.sha256(base64.b64decode(frame_b64)).hexdigest(),
    }
    async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=4.0) as client:
        r = await client.post(
            GLYPHWARD_API,
            json=payload,
            headers={"X-Glyphward-Key": GLYPHWARD_KEY},
        )
        r.raise_for_status()
        return r.json()

async def pre_scan_gate_ech(
    frame_b64: str,
    context: ECHContext,
    plant_id: str,
    instrument_tag: str,
) -> None:
    result = await scan_ech_frame(frame_b64, context, plant_id, instrument_tag)
    if result["adversarial_score"] >= ECH_THRESHOLD:
        raise AdversarialECHImageError(
            f"Adversarial injection detected in {context} (score {result['adversarial_score']}) "
            f"at plant {plant_id} instrument {instrument_tag}. "
            "Frame withheld from ECH chlorohydrination AI pipeline."
        )

class AdversarialECHImageError(RuntimeError):
    pass