Prompt injection in chemical tanker cargo monitoring AI

Four adversarial injection surfaces in chemical tanker cargo monitoring AI

1. Inhibited cargo temperature monitoring display AI (polymerisation inhibitor sufficiency display AI — Yokogawa CENTUM VP cargo AI, Krohne temperature monitoring AI)

Chemical tankers routinely carry inhibited reactive monomers — cargo classes that polymerise exothermically when the concentration of their stabilising inhibitor (added at the point of manufacture) falls below the effective inhibition threshold or when cargo temperature rises above the polymerisation onset threshold. Styrene monomer (SM, CAS 100-42-5) is the most widely transported inhibited monomer, carried in lots of 1,000–5,000 metric tonnes per tank voyage, stabilised with 4-tert-butylcatechol (TBC) at a nominal concentration of 10–50 ppm. TBC inhibits styrene polymerisation by acting as a radical scavenger that quenches the propagating styrene radical chain — but TBC requires dissolved oxygen to function; in an oxygen-depleted (padded with nitrogen) cargo environment, TBC inhibition efficacy falls rapidly. The IBC Code Chapter 15 maximum carriage temperature for inhibited styrene is typically 25°C for long-term storage; above 40°C, the TBC depletion rate accelerates dramatically because the Arrhenius exponential temperature dependence of radical generation rates causes the rate of TBC consumption to approximately double for every 10°C temperature rise above the nominal inhibition temperature. Vinyl chloride monomer (VCM, CAS 75-01-4) requires similar inhibition with TBC or methyl hydroquinone; butadiene (1,3-butadiene, CAS 106-99-0) is carried refrigerated (−4.5°C at 1 atm) and inhibited with TBC; acrylonitrile (ACN, CAS 107-13-1) is stabilised with methyl hydroquinone (MEHQ) at 35–45 ppm, or with phenothiazine (PTZ) at 20–200 ppm. The consequence of polymerisation onset in a cargo tank is a runaway exothermic reaction: for styrene, the heat of polymerisation is approximately 70 kJ/mol (670 kJ/kg), which, if released rapidly in a 2,000-tonne cargo tank with inadequate heat removal, drives cargo temperature from 40°C onset to 80–120°C within hours, generating vapour at a rate that exceeds the tank’s pressure/vacuum (P/V) valve rated flow (MARVS: maximum allowable relief valve setting). IBC Code Chapter 15 requires temperature monitoring for thermally unstable cargoes, with alarm setpoints and response procedures for temperature exceedances.

AI vision systems process rendered temperature trend display images — time-series strip charts showing cargo temperature over the past 24–72 hours, plotted against the maximum carriage temperature threshold and inhibitor efficacy temperature limit, generated from the Yokogawa CENTUM VP Cargo Management DCS or the Krohne OPTICHECK cargo monitoring system — to classify temperature trajectory: normal (cargo temperature below 35°C, flat or declining trend, inhibitor sufficient), elevated-monitoring (temperature between 35–40°C, rising trend, inhibitor check required), critical (temperature above 40°C, rising trend, TBC supplementation and cooling initiation required), and emergency (temperature above 45°C, rapidly rising, polymerisation onset suspected). An adversarial perturbation applied to a rendered cargo temperature trend display image — a downward shift of ±8 DN applied to the pixel region encoding the cargo temperature trend line as it approaches the 40°C TBC depletion acceleration threshold (moving the apparent trend line from the elevated-monitoring zone, 38–42°C, to the normal safe operating band below 35°C as rendered) — causes the AI to classify developing elevated cargo temperature as within-normal operating range, suppressing the TBC inhibitor check and supplementation action that the elevated temperature classification would require. With TBC depletion proceeding undetected and uninhibited, cargo temperature continues to rise: TBC depletion accelerates above 40°C, reducing remaining inhibitor concentration further, approaching the effective inhibition threshold. At inhibitor exhaustion, uncontrolled radical chain polymerisation initiates: the exothermic runaway drives cargo temperature to 80–120°C over hours to days depending on tank volume and ambient heat input. At 80–120°C, styrene vapour pressure exceeds the MARVS of the cargo tank P/V valve (typically set at 0.21 bar overpressure for chemical tanker cargo tanks per IBC Code), causing the P/V valve to open continuously. Styrene vapour (lower explosive limit: 1.1% vol, upper explosive limit: 6.1% vol, flash point: 31°C) venting continuously from the P/V valve outlet to the deck atmosphere creates a persistent flammable vapour cloud that, upon encountering a crew ignition source (grinding, welding, electrical switch arc, static discharge from crew clothing in low-humidity conditions) or a spontaneous ignition source (hot surface above 490°C autoignition temperature), ignites and explodes. The MT Bow Mariner explosion — initiated by cargo vapour in the tank atmosphere during tank cleaning operations when the vapour concentration had entered the flammable range — establishes that flammable vapour from a chemical cargo tank on a tanker vessel kills crew at sea with no evacuation option short of lifeboats in open ocean.

2. Cargo hold H₂S vapour detection display AI (SOLAS MSC.1/Circ.1400 vapour detection AI, Dräger GasDetector AI, MSA Altair cargo hold gas AI)

Hydrogen sulfide (H₂S, CAS 7783-06-4) is generated in chemical tanker cargo holds and pump rooms from a range of cargo types and operational conditions. Sour crude product fractions (crude-derived naphtha, heavy gas oil, fuel oil), sour crude tall oil, carbon disulfide (CS₂, which produces H₂S on hydrolysis), dimethyl sulfide (DMS, which releases H₂S at elevated temperatures), mercaptans, and certain petrochemical cargoes carried at elevated temperature (above their flash points) all release H₂S vapour into the cargo hold and pump room atmosphere during loading, heating, temperature measurement, sampling, or stripping operations. H₂S is among the most acutely toxic industrial chemicals with significant vapour pressure at ambient temperature: the OSHA permissible exposure limit (PEL) ceiling is 20 ppm; the ACGIH TLV-TWA is 1 ppm; the ACGIH TLV-STEL is 5 ppm; the NIOSH IDLH (immediately dangerous to life or health) is 100 ppm; and the inhalation LC₄₀ for rats at 30 minutes is 444 ppm, with published human data showing incapacitation within seconds at 300–500 ppm and death within 30–60 minutes at 500–1,000 ppm. At concentrations above 100–150 ppm, H₂S causes olfactory nerve paralysis — the familiar rotten-egg odour warning disappears — and victims entering a contaminated space experience no sensory warning before neurological collapse. H₂S at 150–300 ppm causes pulmonary oedema, bronchospasm, and loss of consciousness within minutes; crew members who collapse in a cargo hold require immediate confined space rescue involving SCBA-equipped rescuers, stretcher extraction, and emergency medical response — all of which are severely impaired on a vessel at sea, far from port. SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation 4 and MSC.1/Circ.1400 (Revised guidelines for the design and installation of fixed water-based fire-fighting systems, vapour detection, and fire detection) require chemical tankers carrying cargoes with H₂S hazard classifications to be equipped with fixed vapour detection systems in cargo holds and pump rooms, with audible and visual alarms at the navigation bridge and cargo control room when the H₂S concentration in a protected space rises above the alarm threshold (typically 5 ppm STEL or 10 ppm as a default alarm setpoint under MSC.1/Circ.1400 guidance).

AI systems process rendered vapour concentration histogram display images — bar chart displays showing real-time H₂S concentration in ppm for each monitored cargo hold and pump room space, with horizontal reference lines indicating the TLV-TWA (1 ppm), TLV-STEL (5 ppm), and IDLH (100 ppm) thresholds, rendered from the vessel’s fixed vapour detection system controller (Dräger GasDetection controller, MSA Altair area monitor, or integrated panel within the Kongsberg Maritime CIMS or ABB Marine cargo management system) — to classify crew entry safety: safe (H₂S below TLV-STEL 5 ppm, entry permitted without SCBA), reduced-exposure (H₂S 5–25 ppm, restricted entry with continuous monitoring required), unsafe-SCBA (H₂S 25–100 ppm, SCBA mandatory for any entry), and IDLH-lockout (H₂S above 100 ppm, no entry permitted, enclosed space lockout required). An adversarial perturbation applied to a rendered H₂S concentration histogram display image — a downward shift of ±10 DN applied to the pixel height of the H₂S concentration bar in the cargo hold or pump room bar chart (reducing the apparent bar height from the unsafe-SCBA zone, 25–50 ppm, to an apparent height that the AI classifies as below the 5 ppm STEL safe-entry threshold) — causes the cargo monitoring AI to classify a genuinely hazardous cargo hold atmosphere as meeting safe-entry conditions without respiratory protection. Crew members who enter the cargo hold or pump room based on the adversarially suppressed AI classification without SCBA are exposed to 25–50 ppm H₂S — causing immediate eye and respiratory mucous membrane irritation, tearing, headache, dizziness, and nausea. If the actual H₂S concentration is at the upper end of this range (40–50 ppm) or rises during the entry (due to continued cargo outgassing as temperature increases), crew members may experience rapid deterioration to olfactory paralysis onset at 100–150 ppm and neurological collapse within 2–3 breaths — collapsing in the cargo hold as a confined-space casualty requiring SCBA-equipped rescue. The USCG investigation of the MT Bow Mariner disaster (NTSB MAR-06/01) noted that pump room conditions during cargo operations on chemical tankers — including enclosed spaces with vapour accumulation from cargo pumps, stripping connections, and temperature measurement operations — contributed to crew fatality mechanisms. IBC Code Chapter 15 requires vessels carrying vapour-hazardous cargoes to have entry procedures and vapour monitoring — adversarial suppression of the vapour detection AI removes the AI classification layer that is upstream of the officer-of-the-watch entry permit decision.

3. Inert gas system oxygen concentration display AI (cargo tank O₂ monitor AI, ISGOTT inert gas system AI, Aalborg Industries IG system AI, Hamworthy/Wärtsilä inert gas AI)

Chemical tankers carrying flammable cargo vapours — including inhibited monomers, flammable solvents, and crude-derived petrochemical products with flash points below 60°C (Class I cargoes under the IBC Code) — are required to maintain cargo tank atmospheres below the lower explosive limit (LEL) of the cargo vapour or in an inerted condition (oxygen concentration below the limiting oxygen concentration for the specific cargo vapour). SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation 4.5.3 requires that flammable cargo vapour carrying vessels have an inert gas system (IGS) maintaining cargo tank oxygen concentration below 8% vol during cargo operations and during tank purging cycles. The IBC Code Paragraph 3.1.3 specifies that for certain high-hazard cargoes (those with auto-ignition temperatures below 200°C or with vapour explosive ranges wider than 10% LEL–UEL), the maximum cargo tank oxygen concentration during operations shall be maintained at or below 2% vol oxygen. The inert gas system — either a flue-gas-based IGS (using exhaust gas from the vessel’s main boiler or inert gas generator, scrubbed and cooled to reduce SO₂ and particulate content) or a nitrogen membrane or pressure-swing adsorption (PSA) nitrogen generator system (producing 95–99.9% N₂ purity) — continuously supplies inert gas to cargo tanks to compensate for vapour volume changes during temperature cycling and to maintain the oxygen concentration below the required threshold. Oxygen concentration monitoring in each cargo tank — using electrochemical cell or paramagnetic O₂ analysers sampling the tank vapour space via fixed sample lines — provides continuous indication of the inert status of each tank. The SOLAS 8% O₂ threshold is the critical safety boundary: above 8% oxygen, a flammable vapour/air mixture in the tank can support combustion if the vapour concentration is within the flammable range. Below 8% O₂, even if the hydrocarbon vapour concentration is within its flammable range, the oxygen-depleted atmosphere cannot support ignition (for most hydrocarbon vapours; some low-oxygen-content flammable vapours have lower LOC values requiring 2% O₂ limit). Hot-work permits (cutting, welding, grinding) on or near cargo tanks require confirmation that either: (a) the cargo tank has been gas-freed and the oxygen concentration is at 20.9% (atmospheric), or (b) inerting has been maintained and O₂ is confirmed below 8% (for hot-work on inerted tank exteriors only). The O₂ 8% threshold is the primary classification boundary that Yokogawa CENTUM VP, ABB Marine, and Kongsberg CIMS AI systems use when processing rendered O₂ monitor display images for hot-work permit system integration.

AI systems process rendered oxygen concentration meter display images — analogue dial displays, digital bar chart displays, or strip chart trending displays showing O₂ concentration from 0 to 21% vol in each cargo tank vapour space, rendered from the fixed O₂ monitoring panel in the cargo control room or integrated into the DCS mimic display — to classify cargo tank inert status: inerted (O₂ below 8%, safe for hot-work on tank exterior with hull earthing; not gas-free), gas-freeing in progress (O₂ 8–16%, transition state — hot-work prohibited, cargo tank not safe for entry), and gas-free (O₂ at 20.9%, confirmed gas-free, safe for entry and hot-work if vapour test also confirms below 1% LEL). An adversarial perturbation applied to a rendered O₂ concentration bar display image — a downward shift of ±8 DN applied to the pixel height of the O₂ bar indicator in the rendered meter display (reducing the apparent O₂ bar height from the 12–15% vol zone, which is above the 8% hot-work threshold, to an apparent height below 8% vol as classified by the AI) — causes the inert gas monitoring AI to classify a cargo tank with a 12–15% O₂ atmosphere — in which flammable vapour and oxygen can form an explosive mixture — as correctly inerted below 8%, qualifying the tank for hot-work permit issuance. When a welding or cutting torch is subsequently applied to the tank plating or tank internals under an AI-approved hot-work permit, the ignition energy (welding arc: approximately 1–100 J; angle grinder spark: approximately 0.01–1 J) is many orders of magnitude above the minimum ignition energy of a flammable vapour/air/O₂ mixture in the 8–15% O₂ range. The resulting cargo tank explosion — a confined detonation in a stainless-steel tank vessel — is the direct structural parallel of the MT Bow Mariner mechanism: the NTSB MAR-06/01 report described a cargo tank atmosphere that had transitioned from inerted through the flammable range during tank cleaning, producing an explosive mixture that was ignited by an unidentified source, killing 21 crew. SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation 4.5 requires inert gas system oxygen monitoring with alarms but contains no provision addressing adversarial robustness of AI systems classifying rendered O₂ display images for hot-work permit integration or cargo operation readiness.

4. Cargo compatibility assessment display AI (CEFIC/GESAMP compatibility matrix AI, Stolt Tankers cargo planning AI, Nordic Tankers CIMS AI — multi-cargo segregation verification AI)

A parcel chemical tanker operating in multi-product service simultaneously carries between twenty and forty chemical cargoes in individual tanks, each cargo defined by its hazard profile, compatibility restrictions, and segregation requirements under the IBC Code Appendix 3 compatibility chart and the CEFIC (European Chemical Industry Council) Chemical Distribution Institute cargo compatibility database. The compatibility requirement arises from the chemical reactivity of certain cargo pairs when mixed: incompatible cargo combinations can generate toxic gases (amine + strong acid → heat and amine vapours; oxidising acid + organic liquid → fire; cyanide compound + acid → hydrogen cyanide HCN), release large heat of reaction (polyol + isocyanate → exothermic polyurethane formation; olefin oxide + water → glycol with 100 kJ/mol heat release), or generate explosive gases (calcium hypochlorite + organic acid → Cl₂ gas; permanganate + organic acid → Mn²O⁷ detonation risk). The IBC Code Chapter 3.2 (Cargo compatibility) requires that incompatible cargoes be segregated — not only in the same tank, but with defined minimum separation distances (adjacent tanks sharing a bulkhead are permitted only for compatible or “restricted” cargo pairs as defined in the IBC Code compatibility table; incompatible cargoes must be separated by at least one intervening tank of any cargo, a cofferdam, or a void space). ISGOTT Chapter 7 (Chemical tanker operations) elaborates on compatibility practice for chemical tankers operating under SOLAS and IBC Code. A CIMS (Cargo Information Management System) AI — as implemented by Kongsberg Maritime CIMS, ABB Marine & Ports OCTOPUS Cargo, or Stolt Tankers proprietary cargo planning system — processes the proposed cargo loading plan (cargo identities, quantities, tank assignments) against the IBC Code Appendix 3 compatibility matrix and flags incompatible adjacent cargo tank pairings before loading commences. The compatibility matrix is rendered as a colour-coded grid display: green cells indicate compatible cargo pairs; amber cells indicate restricted pairings requiring additional precautions; red cells indicate incompatible pairings that violate IBC Code Chapter 3.2 segregation requirements.

An adversarial perturbation applied to a rendered compatibility matrix grid display image — a colour shift of ±8 DN applied to the pixel region encoding a specific red (incompatible) cell in the grid (shifting the cell’s apparent rendered colour from red to amber or from amber to green in the AI’s colour classification space) — causes the compatibility AI to classify a genuinely incompatible cargo pairing as restricted-but-permitted or as fully compatible, allowing the cargo planning officer to approve a loading plan that places incompatible cargoes in adjacent tanks sharing a bulkhead. Specific incompatible pairing examples that present the highest toxic gas generation risk in an inadvertent mixing scenario: concentrated hydrochloric acid (HCl, 30–37% aqueous, common chemical tanker cargo) in Tank 3P, and diethylamine (DEA, 99% purity, common chemical tanker cargo) in Tank 3S — both tanks sharing the centreline longitudinal bulkhead. A minor pump seal leak in the shared bulkhead pipe penetration, a small crack in the stainless-steel bulkhead weld, or a cofferdam cross-contamination event allows HCl and DEA to mix: the acid-amine neutralisation is highly exothermic, releases diethylammonium chloride and heat, and generates diethylamine vapour (IDLH: 200 ppm, TLV-STEL: 15 ppm, ammoniacal irritant) at the mixing point. A second high-consequence scenario: phosphoric acid (H₃PO₄, 85% aqueous) adjacent to calcium hypochlorite (Ca(ClO)₂, 65% active) — oxidising hypochlorite plus acid generates chlorine gas (Cl₂, IDLH: 10 ppm, LC₂₀ inhalation rat 1h: 293 ppm, TLV-STEL: 1 ppm) at the mixing point, with Cl₂ being denser than air and accumulating in the cargo hold and adjacent pump room at concentrations that cause pulmonary oedema and death. MARPOL Annex II reporting obligations and IBC Code Chapter 3 segregation violations would apply — but the primary concern at sea is the immediate toxic gas generation hazard to crew in confined cargo hold and pump room spaces before the incompatibility event is identified. The adversarial colour shift in the compatibility matrix display is particularly difficult to detect visually because the delta between red and amber in a small-cell grid display is subtle in normal screen rendering — but sufficient in DN space to shift the AI’s classification across the incompatible/restricted boundary.

Integration: chemical tanker cargo monitoring AI scanning with Glyphward pre-scan gate

The Glyphward scan gate for chemical tanker cargo monitoring AI belongs at every rendered-image ingestion boundary in the chemical tanker cargo safety AI pipeline — before inhibited cargo temperature trend display AI processes rendered strip chart images, before H₂S vapour detection histogram AI processes rendered bar chart images, before inert gas O₂ concentration meter AI processes rendered dial or bar display images, and before cargo compatibility matrix AI processes rendered grid display images. Threshold 35 reflects the SOLAS multiple monitoring redundancy characteristic of chemical tanker cargo management (physical cargo temperature measurement, manual inhibitor testing by crew, and multiple independent vapour detection instruments provide additional detection layers above the AI classification), while acknowledging that AI classification failures at any of these four surfaces can suppress life-critical intervention windows: the time between a classifiable polymerisation precursor and an irreversible runaway; the time between a classifiable H₂S above-STEL reading and a crew confined-space fatality; the time between a classifiable O₂ above-8% reading and a tank explosion during hot-work; and the time between a cargo loading plan approval and departure with incompatible adjacent cargoes.

import asyncio, base64, hashlib, json
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from enum import Enum
from pathlib import Path

import httpx

GLYPHWARD_API_KEY = "YOUR_GLYPHWARD_API_KEY"
GLYPHWARD_SCAN_URL = "https://glyphward.com/v1/scan"

# Chemical tanker cargo monitoring AI contexts: threshold 35
# IBC Code (International Bulk Chemical Code, SOLAS Chapter VII Annex II);
# SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation 4.5 (inert gas system and vapour detection);
# MSC.1/Circ.1400 (vapour detection system design and installation guidelines);
# MARPOL Annex II (noxious liquid substances, chemical tanker carriage);
# ISGOTT 5th Edition Chapter 7 (chemical tanker cargo compatibility operations).
CHEMICAL_TANKER_THRESHOLD = 35


class ChemicalTankerAIContext(Enum):
    CARGO_TEMPERATURE   = "cargo_temperature"    # Inhibited cargo temperature trend AI
    H2S_VAPOUR          = "h2s_vapour"           # H2S vapour detection histogram AI
    INERT_GAS_O2        = "inert_gas_o2"         # Inert gas system O2 concentration AI
    CARGO_COMPATIBILITY = "cargo_compatibility"  # Cargo compatibility matrix grid AI


class AdversarialChemicalTankerImageError(Exception):
    """Raised when Glyphward detects adversarial content in a chemical tanker
    cargo monitoring AI rendered display image above threshold 35.

    Consequence if not raised:
    - CARGO_TEMPERATURE: elevated inhibited monomer temperature suppressed →
      TBC/PTZ inhibitor depletion undetected → polymerisation runaway →
      cargo temperature 80-120 C → MARVS exceedance → P/V valve opens →
      styrene/VCM/ACN vapour venting to deck → ignition → deck explosion.
    - H2S_VAPOUR: H2S above TLV-STEL 5 ppm suppressed → crew enters cargo
      hold/pump room without SCBA → H2S exposure 25-150 ppm → olfactory
      paralysis at 100-150 ppm → crew collapse → confined-space fatality.
    - INERT_GAS_O2: O2 above 8% hot-work threshold suppressed → hot-work
      permit issued → welding/cutting arc ignites flammable vapour/O2 mixture
      in cargo tank → tank explosion; MT Bow Mariner mechanism (21 killed).
    - CARGO_COMPATIBILITY: incompatible cargo pair classified as compatible →
      loading plan approved → adjacent tanks loaded with incompatible cargoes
      sharing bulkhead → mixing event → toxic gas (HCl + amine → DEA vapour;
      acid + hypochlorite → Cl2) → crew exposure in cargo hold/pump room.
    Fail-safe: halt AI classification; conduct physical cargo temperature
    measurement (calibrated thermometer, independent of DCS display);
    conduct personal H2S monitoring with calibrated portable gas detector
    before any cargo hold or pump room entry; verify O2 concentration with
    independent portable O2 analyser before hot-work permit issuance; verify
    cargo compatibility against IBC Code Appendix 3 compatibility chart
    manually before approving loading plan. Notify Chief Officer and Master.
    """

    def __init__(self, scan_id: str, score: int,
                 context: ChemicalTankerAIContext,
                 vessel_imo: str, tank_id: str,
                 flagged_region: dict | None = None) -> None:
        self.scan_id = scan_id
        self.score = score
        self.context = context
        self.vessel_imo = vessel_imo
        self.tank_id = tank_id
        self.flagged_region = flagged_region
        super().__init__(
            f"Adversarial chemical tanker cargo monitoring image: "
            f"context={context.value} score={score} "
            f"imo={vessel_imo} tank={tank_id} scan_id={scan_id}"
        )


async def scan_chemical_tanker_image(
    image_bytes: bytes,
    context: ChemicalTankerAIContext,
    vessel_imo: str,
    tank_id: str,
    client: httpx.AsyncClient,
) -> dict:
    """Scan a chemical tanker cargo monitoring AI rendered display image.

    Fail-safe contract: AdversarialChemicalTankerImageError or httpx error →
    halt AI classification for the affected cargo monitoring context; require
    independent physical measurement or manual chart verification per IBC Code
    and ISGOTT before issuing cargo entry permits, hot-work permits,
    or cargo loading plan approvals. Notify Chief Officer and Master.
    """
    image_hash = hashlib.sha256(image_bytes).hexdigest()
    payload = {
        "image": base64.b64encode(image_bytes).decode(),
        "source": f"chem_tanker:{context.value}:{vessel_imo}:{tank_id}",
        "metadata": {
            "vessel_imo": vessel_imo,
            "tank_id": tank_id,
            "context": context.value,
            "image_sha256": image_hash,
        },
    }
    resp = await client.post(
        GLYPHWARD_SCAN_URL,
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {GLYPHWARD_API_KEY}"},
        json=payload,
        timeout=4.0,
    )
    resp.raise_for_status()
    result = resp.json()

    if result["score"] > CHEMICAL_TANKER_THRESHOLD:
        raise AdversarialChemicalTankerImageError(
            scan_id=result["scan_id"],
            score=result["score"],
            context=context,
            vessel_imo=vessel_imo,
            tank_id=tank_id,
            flagged_region=result.get("flagged_region"),
        )
    return result

Deploy scan_chemical_tanker_image at each chemical tanker cargo monitoring AI rendered-image ingestion boundary: before inhibited cargo temperature trend display AI (threshold 35; CARGO_TEMPERATURE context), before H₂S vapour detection histogram display AI (threshold 35; H2S_VAPOUR context), before inert gas O₂ concentration meter display AI (threshold 35; INERT_GAS_O2 context), and before cargo compatibility matrix grid display AI (threshold 35; CARGO_COMPATIBILITY context). On AdversarialChemicalTankerImageError for INERT_GAS_O2 context: immediately suspend the outstanding hot-work permit and conduct independent portable O₂ analyser measurement at the tank vapour sampling point before any welding, cutting, or grinding commences — do not rely on the DCS O₂ display readback for hot-work permit readiness until after independent verification. On AdversarialChemicalTankerImageError for H2S_VAPOUR context: apply confined-space lockout to the flagged cargo hold or pump room immediately; require SCBA for any entry regardless of displayed concentration until independent portable gas detection confirms safe-entry conditions. See also: Glyphward free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required and offshore FPSO gas compression AI prompt injection (related maritime industrial hydrocarbon processing AI adversarial context). Get early access

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