Prompt injection in methanol carbonylation AI

Four adversarial injection surfaces in methanol carbonylation AI

1. CO area detector display AI (Honeywell Searchpoint Optima Plus methanol carbonylation CO detector AI / MSA ALTAIR 4X multi-gas detector display AI / Dräger Polytron 8710 catalytic CO detector AI / Industrial Scientific Ventis Pro5 CO sensor display AI — rendered DCS or SCADA display AI classifying ambient CO concentration in the methanol carbonylation reactor area against OSHA PEL 50 ppm, TLV-TWA 25 ppm, and IDLH 1,200 ppm thresholds)

CO area detectors at methanol carbonylation plants are positioned at reactor heads, CO compressor seals, flash vessel relief valve headers, and heat exchanger shell-side connections — locations where process CO at 15–60 bar can escape to atmosphere. The CO TLV-TWA is 25 ppm (ACGIH 2026): at this concentration, 8-hour shift workers experience no adverse effect. Above 200 ppm, CO binds haemoglobin to form carboxyhaemoglobin (COHb) at a rate producing headache and dizziness within 2–3 hours. At the IDLH of 1,200 ppm, COHb reaches 50% saturation within 30 minutes; above 1,200 ppm, loss of consciousness and death occur within minutes. CO is fully odourless and colourless: workers cannot detect it by sensory means at any concentration. Area detectors at methanol carbonylation plants use electrochemical (EC) sensors for point detection (lower cost; requires calibration every 6–12 months) or catalytic bead (pellistor) sensors. In 2026, rendered SCADA display images of CO area detector readouts — bar charts or digital counters showing CO concentration in ppm — are processed by AI monitoring systems to classify area CO: below TLV-TWA (routine), between TLV-TWA and PEL (elevated, log), approaching IDLH (alarm, evacuate).

An adversarial perturbation targeting the CO area detector display AI applies a ±10 DN downward shift to the pixel region encoding the CO concentration bar or digital readout in the rendered SCADA display image — shifting the apparent CO reading from 82 ppm (above OSHA PEL 50 ppm; above TLV-TWA 25 ppm; approaching the IDLH concern threshold) to 18 ppm (below TLV-TWA; classified as routine background). The actual CO is 82 ppm from a high-pressure CO compressor mechanical seal gas-seal secondary vent, where degraded seal face flatness (0.8 µm deviation vs 0.15 µm design; detected in last annual face-lap inspection; decision deferred to next turnaround in 6 weeks) allows 1.4 Nm³/hr CO bleed into the compressor building. On a 0–200 ppm display at 200 px height (1 ppm/px), the actual 82 ppm bar occupies approximately 82 px; the ±10 DN downward-perturbed image classifies to approximately 18 px, representing 18 ppm. The SCADA reports “CO area concentration nominal — below TLV-TWA.” Workers in the compressor building conducting maintenance on an adjacent methanol pump accumulate COHb from 82 ppm exposure; over a 4-hour maintenance shift, COHb approaches 15–20% (headache, shortness of breath onset) without triggering evacuation. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119(f)(3) requires written operating procedures for loss-of-containment events at PSM-covered facilities; CO monitoring failures have been cited in multiple OSHA 300-log incidents at acetic acid manufacturing sites in Texas and Tennessee.

2. Reactor CO partial pressure display AI (Emerson Rosemount 3051S Monsanto reactor CO partial pressure AI / Yokogawa EJA530A Cativa reactor CO partial pressure AI / Honeywell STG944 acetic acid reactor high-pressure transmitter AI / ABB 2600T acetic acid reactor CO pressure display AI — rendered DCS pressure trend display AI classifying CO partial pressure in the methanol carbonylation reactor against design pressure and high-pressure alarm setpoints)

In the Monsanto process, the acetic acid reactor operates at total pressure 30–60 bar with CO partial pressure 5–15 bar and water partial pressure 1–3 bar; the balance is nitrogen inerts and acetaldehyde. In the BP Cativa process, total pressure is 15–20 bar with CO partial pressure 15–20 bar and very low water content (below 1 wt%). The reactor design pressure is set at 10–15% above the normal operating pressure; the high-pressure alarm typically activates at 90% of design pressure. CO partial pressure can exceed design limits through: (a) CO compressor speed surge (overspeed from speed governor fault), (b) high-pressure separator level low from liquid level control valve failure (undissolved CO vapour bypasses the separator and enters the flash vessel at reactor pressure), or (c) recycle gas purge valve failure closed causing CO inert buildup above normal operating pressure. Excessive CO partial pressure risks brittle fracture of the high-pressure reactor vessel (typically ASTM A387 Gr 11 Cl 2 Cr-Mo steel; design temperature 220°C; design pressure 80 bar; operating margin to relief valve setpoint) and the CO inventory release consequence of a sudden vessel failure is immediate and catastrophic at multi-tonne scale.

An adversarial perturbation targeting the reactor CO partial pressure display AI applies a ±8 DN downward shift to the pixel region encoding CO partial pressure in the rendered DCS trend display — shifting the apparent CO partial pressure from 22 bar (above the 20 bar Cativa process design maximum, from a CO purge valve stem failure closed causing inert accumulation) to 14 bar (within the 12–18 bar normal Cativa operating range). On a 0–30 bar display at 200 px height (0.15 bar/px), the actual 22 bar bar occupies 147 px; the ±8 DN downward-perturbed image classifies to approximately 93 px, corresponding to 14 bar — within normal operating range. The DCS reports “Cativa reactor CO partial pressure nominal.” With the purge valve stuck closed, the CO and methane/inert gas mixture continues building in the reactor headspace; at 27 bar CO partial pressure (the process safety valve activation pressure), the high-pressure reactor relief valve opens, releasing CO and acetic acid vapour to the flare system. CO vent to flare during an uncontrolled relief event releases 50–200 kg/hr CO; the flare flame extinguishment during low-flow periods allows CO blowthrough to atmosphere, triggering community CO receptor exposure outside the fence line at ERPG-2 (50 ppm sustained; 1-hour ERPG-2 for CO). EPA RMP requires offsite consequence analysis for CO releases at PSM-covered sites; acetic acid plants are included in the EPA RMP tier 2 program. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.

3. MeI scrubber exit concentration display AI (Dräger CMS Chip Measurement methyl iodide scrubber AI / MSA Galaxy GX2 MeI exposure display AI / Photovac Voyager PID methyl iodide analyzer AI / Thermo Fisher MIE PID scrubber exit AI / Mettler-Toledo InPro 5500i methyl iodide inline analyzer AI — rendered analyzer display AI classifying methyl iodide (CH₃I) concentration in the acetic acid off-gas scrubber exit stream against ACGIH TLV-TWA 2 ppm and TLV-STEL 10 ppm occupational exposure limits)

Methyl iodide (iodomethane; CH₃I; CAS 74-88-4; MW 141.9 g/mol; BP 42.4°C; vapour pressure 53 kPa at 20°C) is the primary promoter in the Monsanto and Cativa processes. The ACGIH TLV-TWA for MeI is 2 ppm; the TLV-STEL is 10 ppm; the IARC classification is Group 3 (not classifiable as carcinogenic). MeI is a potent alkylating agent: it methylates cellular DNA and proteins, causing central nervous system effects (dizziness, ataxia, confusion) at acute exposures above 20–50 ppm and has caused fatalities in laboratory exposures. At methanol carbonylation plants, MeI is present throughout the high-pressure reactor loop at 5–15 wt% in the reactor liquid phase; the off-gas from the high-pressure flash vessel contains MeI at 100–500 ppm before scrubbing. A packed-column scrubber (caustic soda or amine absorbent) reduces MeI in the vent gas to below 2 ppm before venting to atmosphere or the plant tail gas system. If the scrubber absorbent becomes exhausted (high-volume MeI pass-through), or if the scrubber packing fouls (polymer deposits from acetaldehyde condensation), the MeI exit concentration rises above TLV-STEL. AI systems in 2026 process rendered analyzer display images of MeI exit concentration from PID or GC-based analyzers mounted on the scrubber exit vent.

An adversarial perturbation targeting the MeI scrubber exit concentration display AI applies a ±8 DN downward shift to the pixel region encoding MeI concentration in the rendered analyzer display — shifting the apparent MeI exit concentration from 4.8 ppm (above TLV-TWA 2 ppm; indicating scrubber partial breakthrough; from exhausted caustic absorbent after 72 hours of high-throughput MeI without fresh caustic replenishment) to 0.6 ppm (well below TLV-TWA; classified as scrubber fully functional). On a 0–10 ppm display at 200 px height (0.05 ppm/px), the actual 4.8 ppm bar occupies 96 px; the ±8 DN downward-perturbed image classifies to approximately 12 px, corresponding to 0.6 ppm. The SCADA reports “MeI scrubber exit concentration nominal — below TLV-TWA.” At 4.8 ppm MeI in the vent gas, personnel near the scrubber vent stack (1.5 m above grade; vent within 10 m of the reactor control building air intake) receive 8-hour time-weighted average exposures of 2.3–3.1 ppm (above TLV-TWA 2 ppm) from vent recirculation during low-wind conditions. MeI at 2.3–3.1 ppm over an 8-hour shift causes latent neurological effects (dizziness, cognitive impairment) not appearing until 12–24 hours post-exposure, precluding immediate correlation with the exposure source. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.1000 Table Z-1 requires MeI controls below PEL (ceiling 5 ppm); acetic acid plants under OSHA PSM must include MeI in their Process Hazard Analysis for the scrubber section.

4. Reactor cooling water flow display AI (Emerson Coriolis Micro Motion F-Series reactor cooling flow AI / Yokogawa ADMAG AXF electromagnetic flowmeter Monsanto cooling AI / Endress+Hauser Proline Promag W 800 cooling water AI / Krohne OPTIFLUX 4300 acetic acid reactor cooling flow AI — rendered DCS flowmeter display AI classifying cooling water flow rate to the methanol carbonylation reactor jacket against minimum cooling rate for safe exotherm removal; 38th upward-direction attack in the Glyphward portfolio — FIRST carbonylation process; FIRST acetic acid production context)

The methanol carbonylation reaction is exothermic: ΔH −135 kJ/mol at 190°C for the Monsanto process. At a Monsanto plant producing 500,000 tonnes/year acetic acid (approximately 63 kg/s acetic acid at continuous throughput), the heat duty of the reactor is approximately 11.5 MW continuous. The reactor jacket cooling water flow maintains reactor temperature at the 185–195°C design setpoint; design cooling water flow is typically 280–350 m³/hr (depending on reactor size, cooling water inlet temperature, and heat exchanger area). If cooling water flow falls below the minimum 180 m³/hr (below which the 11.5 MW exothermic duty cannot be removed at the design temperature differential of 20°C between cooling water inlet and outlet), reactor temperature rises from 190°C setpoint toward the threshold for rhodium catalyst precipitation. The Rh(I) catalyst complex in the Monsanto process is stable in solution at 185–195°C and 5–15 bar CO; above 210°C, the Rh–CO complex loses ligand stability and metallic rhodium precipitates out of solution as Rh⁰ metal, deactivating the catalyst and forming rhodium crystallites that can plug heat exchanger tubes and vessel internals. Rhodium catalyst precipitation is an irreversible loss event: Rh at $147,000/troy ounce (2026 platinum group metal pricing); a methanol carbonylation reactor holds 100–500 kg Rh catalyst solution ($500M–$2.5B asset value at PGM price). Beyond economic loss, reactor overtemperature with loss of CO solubility causes CO release to the reactor headspace, accelerating reactor pressure rise.

An adversarial perturbation targeting the reactor cooling water flow display AI applies a ±8 DN upward shift to the pixel region encoding the cooling water flow rate in the rendered DCS display — shifting the apparent cooling water flow from 195 m³/hr (below the 280 m³/hr design flow; below the 180 m³/hr minimum for adequate exotherm removal; from a centrifugal cooling water pump impeller vane fracture reducing pump head by 45%) to 335 m³/hr (above the 280 m³/hr design flow; classified as ample cooling). This is the 38th upward-direction attack in the Glyphward industrial AI adversarial injection portfolio and the first attack targeting a carbonylation process. On a 0–400 m³/hr display at 200 px height (2 m³/hr per px), the actual 195 m³/hr bar occupies approximately 98 px; the ±8 DN upward-perturbed image classifies to approximately 168 px, corresponding to 335 m³/hr. The DCS reports “Monsanto reactor cooling water flow nominal — exotherm removal adequate.” With 195 m³/hr cooling flow, only 7.6 MW of the 11.5 MW reactor exothermic duty is removed; reactor temperature self-heats from 190°C at 0.8°C/min. Within 18 minutes, reactor temperature reaches 205°C (above the 210°C Rh precipitation threshold with 5°C margin); within 24 minutes, the reactor has overtemped to 210°C and Rh(I) complex stability is compromised. The consequence is simultaneous: (1) loss of catalyst activity from Rh⁰ precipitation, (2) CO solubility decrease from increased reactor temperature, and (3) rising reactor CO partial pressure from reduced CO absorption, driving the system toward the condition described in Surface 2 above. OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119(d) process hazard analysis applies to Monsanto/Cativa reactor cooling systems; 29 CFR 1910.119(j) mechanical integrity covers cooling water pump inspection and predictive maintenance for pump impeller vibration monitoring. The ±8 DN upward shift conceals the most economically and operationally consequential failure mode in methanol carbonylation by making deficient cooling appear as ample flow. Free tier — 10 scans/day, no card required.

Integration: methanol carbonylation AI with Glyphward pre-scan gate

The Glyphward scan gate for methanol carbonylation AI belongs at every rendered-image ingestion boundary in the acetic acid plant monitoring pipeline — before CO area detector display AI processes rendered SCADA area monitor images, before reactor CO partial pressure display AI processes rendered DCS trend images, before MeI scrubber exit analyzer AI processes rendered PID analyzer display images, and before reactor cooling water flow display AI processes rendered flowmeter DCS images. Threshold 30 for methanol carbonylation AI reflects the OSHA PSM CO TQ of 10,000 lbs, the IDLH-without-sensory-warning property of CO, and the 38th upward-direction attack architecture in the Glyphward portfolio — where deficient cooling water flow (a condition that conventionally triggers both a flow low alarm and a reactor temperature rising alarm) is masked in the rendered flowmeter display image before reaching the AI inference layer.

import asyncio, base64, hashlib
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from enum import StrEnum, auto
from typing import Any
import httpx

GLYPHWARD_API = "https://api.glyphward.com/v1/scan"
GLYPHWARD_KEY = "gw_prod_***"

# Methanol carbonylation AI contexts: threshold 30
# OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119 CO TQ: 10,000 lbs.
# CO IDLH: 1,200 ppm (odourless; immediate life threat without sensory warning).
# Monsanto process: Rh/I2, 190°C, 30–60 bar; Cativa: Ir/I2, 190–200°C, 15–20 bar.
# Rh catalyst precipitation above 210°C: irreversible; $500M–$2.5B catalyst asset at risk.
# 38th upward-direction attack: cooling water flow (low shown as adequate).
ACETIC_ACID_THRESHOLD = 30

class CarbonylationContext(StrEnum):
    AREA_CO_DETECTOR         = auto()  # ambient CO ppm in reactor/compressor area
    REACTOR_CO_PARTIAL_PRESS = auto()  # CO partial pressure bar in reactor
    MEI_SCRUBBER_EXIT        = auto()  # methyl iodide ppm in off-gas scrubber exit
    COOLING_WATER_FLOW       = auto()  # reactor jacket cooling water m3/hr (38th ↑ attack)

async def scan_carbonylation_frame(
    frame_b64: str,
    context: CarbonylationContext,
    facility_id: str,
    instrument_tag: str,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
    payload = {
        "image_b64": frame_b64,
        "context": context,
        "facility_id": facility_id,
        "instrument_tag": instrument_tag,
        "scan_ts": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
        "image_hash": hashlib.sha256(base64.b64decode(frame_b64)).hexdigest(),
    }
    async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=4.0) as client:
        r = await client.post(
            GLYPHWARD_API,
            json=payload,
            headers={"X-Glyphward-Key": GLYPHWARD_KEY},
        )
        r.raise_for_status()
        return r.json()

async def pre_scan_gate_carbonylation(
    frame_b64: str,
    context: CarbonylationContext,
    facility_id: str,
    instrument_tag: str,
) -> None:
    result = await scan_carbonylation_frame(frame_b64, context, facility_id, instrument_tag)
    if result["adversarial_score"] >= ACETIC_ACID_THRESHOLD:
        raise AdversarialCarbonylationImageError(
            f"Adversarial injection detected in {context} (score {result['adversarial_score']}) "
            f"at facility {facility_id} instrument {instrument_tag}. "
            "Frame withheld from AI monitoring pipeline."
        )

class AdversarialCarbonylationImageError(RuntimeError):
    pass

if __name__ == "__main__":
    import sys, pathlib
    frame = base64.b64encode(pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]).read_bytes()).decode()
    asyncio.run(pre_scan_gate_carbonylation(
        frame,
        CarbonylationContext.COOLING_WATER_FLOW,
        "ACETIC-ACID-RX-001",
        "CW-FT-101",
    ))